Book review: Warriors of God

By Bilal Y. Saab – If we are to understand the future of arms control in the Middle East, we must continue to study the growing role of non-state or hybrid actors in that part of the world, for some of them have more military and political power than national leaders and bureaucrats. One of these actors is Hezbollah, the pro-Iran Lebanese Shi’ite party that has a semi-autonomous military wing. My friend Nicholas Blanford, correspondant for the Times of London and the Christian Science Monitor, recently wrote a terrific book on Hezbollah’s military evolution called Warriord of God: Inside Hezbollah’s Thirty-Year Struggle Against Israel (New York: Random House, 2011). I reviewed it in the May 2012 issue of the journal of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism. I have asked its editors for permission to post the full review, I am still waiting for their response. Meanwhile, here is one part of the review, as it appears on the online version of the journal. Should the editors answer affirmatively, I will post the whole thing.

 

 

 

 

Hezbollah is exhausted, and despite what its leadership claims in public, has increasing worries about its future.

 

First, there is a perception within the Lebanese Shi’ite party of being sandwiched between two critical dangers. Its ally to the north,Syria, is facing an existential crisis due to the ongoing popular uprising against its government. Its enemy to the south, Israel, is as concerned as ever about its national security because of regional changes created by the Arab uprising, causing it to be extra sensitive to military threats, especially from Hezbollah.

 

With rockets recently launched from southern Lebanon to its northern region (Hezbollah denied responsibility), Israelis on edge and on alert. Accordingly, any miscalculation or mistake on the part of Hezbollah could cause a large-scale military conflict, one which both sides have been preparing for since the end of the 2006 war and is likely to be far more destructive and consequential than any previous confrontation between the two.

 

If Syria’s future is in jeopardy, Iran, Hezbollah’s closest ally, is also at risk of military assault by Israel and/or the United States and suffering from what appears to be an effective sanctions regime for its controversial nuclear program. And with reports mentioning that Hamas is on the verge of downgrading relations with Syria and Iran, Hezbollah could also be left with no reliable partner in the Palestinian Territories. In sum, the “Resistance Axis,” which consists primarily of Iran, Syria, Hamas, and Hezbollah is under tremendous pressure and could face a mortal blow should Damascus fall and Hamas break ranks.

 

At home, things have also been tough for Hezbollah. The party is clearly feeling the burden of governance. Syria’s forced exit from Lebanon in 2005 pushed Hezbollah to take matters into its own hands in order to protect itself from perceived domestic threats and foes. No longer enjoying direct political sponsorship byDamascus, Hezbollah was forced to adjust and immerse itself deep into a chaotic, sectarian Lebanese political system, to make sure that it did not produce any threats to its existence.

 

The government it helped to create in June 2011, led by prime minister Najib Mikati, is the most recent attempt by Hezbollah to create such a non-threatening political environment inBeirut. The problem is that Mikati’s cabinet has been anything but stable, causing Hezbollah to manage political feuds within its government coalition and make significant political concessions and compromises in order to preserve it. For example, in December 2011, Hezbollah’s leadership approved Mikati’s decision to fund the UN tribunal, which is investigating the assassination of former prime minister Rafik Hariri, despite the fact that the international institution has indicted four of its own members.

 

As the conflict in Syria worsens, Hezbollah will struggle to maintain government stability and contain Sunni–Shi’a tensions inLebanon. The party is keen to avoid sectarian violence at home, aware that this would destabilize the government, possibly awaken so far dormant Sunni extremist cells, and distract it from its primary goal of preparing for war againstIsrael. Hezbollah’s rivals, the pro-U.S. “March 14 coalition,” led by former prime minister Saad Hariri (Rafik’s son), sense that the Syrian crisis is causing Hezbollah to feel more vulnerable and isolated and thus are seeking to gain maximum benefit.

 

In addition to managing an unmanageable Lebanese system, Hezbollah has had to deal with alleged attempts by its international enemies including the United States to penetrate it and wreak havoc from within. Since 2006, there has been a war of intelligence and counterintelligence between Hezbollah on the one hand, and Washington and Tel Aviv on the other. The party’s leadership has recently revealed the identities of CIA officers working undercover in Lebanon, after having managed to partially unravel the agency’s spy network in the country. But it is unclear how much damage Hezbollah has suffered internally over these years and how much intelligence has been gathered on the organization’s jihadist body as a result of this underground war.

 

Not too long ago Hezbollah was an overly confident organization that had big thoughts of liberating Jerusalemand defeating Israel. It enjoyed constant military and political sponsorship from two powerful allies, Syria and Iran. It did not have to worry much about its political fortunes at home. It was very popular in the Arab world, an icon in the Arab street. To its enemies’ spy agencies, it seemed like an impenetrable and rock solid organization. Today, much of that has changed and it is increasingly unclear whether the party can survive the winds of change that are rocking the region or retain its identity as an autonomous politico–military actor.

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This is a preprint of an article whose final and definitive form has been published in the Studies in Conflict and Terrorism (May 2012) [copyright Taylor and Francis]. The article is available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/1057610X.2012.666823

 

 

 

 

 

 

How long will Riyadh wait for Washington?

By Bilal Y. Saab – According to this important April 25 Reuters story, Saudi Arabia expects to finalize its nuclear energy plans this year. In the absence of a non-proliferation, 123 deal between Riyadh and Washington, U.S. companies cannot take over this multi-billion dollar project, possibly missing out on this huge opportunity and leaving it for others (the Koreans?). I see at least two waiting games here – the first, by U.S. firms waiting for the bureaucracy in Washington to approve and ink that 123 deal so they can cash in (not easy at all, this is gonna require a major decision by the U.S. president that will have implications for U.S. non-proliferation policy. Also, expect Congress to be involved too) – the second, by the Saudis, should they come to the conclusion that Washington is either unable or unwilling to endorse this large nuclear project, expect them to knock on other countries’ doors.

 

 

The reasons for Saudi Arabia’s interest in nuclear energy are not unlike those of Kuwait, UAE, and other Arab countries: prestige, economics, and power demands. The Saudis still plan to build their first nuclear plant in 2020. This is all for civilian purposes, of course. But it certainly got me thinking about the Saudis’ overall thinking toward nuclear power. Say the Iran nuclear talks fail and the Iranian centrifuges are still spinning, would Saudi Arabia accelerate its nuclear plans and go for the bomb? It is entirely possible, despite this new, bizarre argument that has surfaced lately undermining the possibility of a nuclear cascade in the Middle East should Iran get the bomb (ok, maybe it will take much more for Egypt, though less so for Turkey, to acquire a nuclear capability, but Saudi Arabia could have an easier road if they play their cards right).

 

Here is some history on the Saudis’ non-proliferation resume and their nuclear ambitions. Saudi Arabia, like other Arab countries, is on the record for saying that it is all for a Middle East free of Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Saudis signed the NPT in 1968 and ratified it two years later in August. They signed the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention in April 1972 and ratified it a month later. They signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in January 1993 and ratified it three years later in August. In June 2005, they signed the Small Quantitites Protocol (though did not adopt the amended SQP), which allows states considered to be low risk to “opt out of more intensive inspection regimes in return for a declaration of their nuclear activities.” So with the exception of them not signing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (which the U.S. has yet to ratify), they have a clean non-proliferation sheet. But of course, there have been rumors associated with Saudi Arabia’s nuclear aspirations. For example, in 1994, Mohammad Abdallah al-Khilewi, a Saudi diplomat posted to the U.N., left his post and asked for political asylum in the U.S. He gave several interviews in which he alleged that his country was involved in a number of schemes to acquire a nuclear weapons capability. He also said that in the 1980s, his government aided Saddam Hussein’s nuclear program financially and technologically in return for a share of the program’s product. In addition to this, don’t forget that Saudi Arabia has a pretty cozy relationship with Sunni Pakistan. Speculation over Saudi-Pakistani nuclear cooperation surfaced in 1999 when Prince Sultan ibn Abdel Aziz visited a uranium enrichment plant and ballistic missile production facilities shortly after the Pakistanis conduted nuclear tests. Also who knows how deep the relationship was between A.Q. Khan and the Saudis.

 

There is no doubt that the Saudis have strong strategic incentives and the money to pursue a nuclear option. Saudi Arabia may be an oil-producing juggernaut with vast financial resources, but it is regionally vulnerable, security wise. Iran has the capability to threaten Saudi national security, meddle in the Kinkdom’s business, and undermine its regional interests (check, check, and check). Saudi Arabia, home to Islam’s two holiest sites, often feels that it needs a powerful (nuclear) deterrent. The Saudis have a much more modern air force than the Iranians and enjoy a close strategic relationship with the United States, but Iran is more experienced in combat and is skilled in asymmetrical warfare, including terrorism. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Saudi Arabia’s armed forces can counter an all-out (Iranian) assault against their country.

 

So let’s go back to the initial question. How long will Riyadh wait for Washington to ink a 123 deal? Not sure, but one thing for certain is that Washington will be very busy for the next year or so (presidential election) and as the Reuters story rightly suggests may not get back to the Saudi King before 2014, which, by that time Saudi Arabia may have found another partner. This is not just about U.S. firms and business opportunities, this is about the future of U.S. nonproliferation policy and U.S. policy for Saudi Arabia.

 

 

Photo: Pablo Martinez Monsivais/AP)

Taking down Damascus in Moscow

By Bilal Y. Saab – There is no question that Washington is suffering from a policy logjam on Syria. The better way to move forward, I say, is by launching high-stakes talks with the Russians. I share the following thoughts on the subject, which appeared in today’s the National Interest.

 

 

Other than what it has already tried, there is nothing the United States can do to stop the violence in Syria or make things better for the opposition forces there: this is the conventional wisdom shared by a good number of analysts in Washington and almost ingrained in the minds of U.S. officials working on Syria policy. But there is another strategy worth pursuing with greater urgency: talk tough and bargain with Moscow.

 

Washington’s policy logjam on Syria is not surprising. There is an acute awareness of the high risks of alternative and perhaps more forceful strategies, be they diplomatic or military. The Obama administration sympathizes with the plight of the Syrian people and is eager to help, but it also does not want to make things worse in that country—and it can’t absorb substantial costs along the way, especially during the fall run-up to the presidential election.

 

Those who remember the horrors of America’s military intervention in Iraq and the fact that it cost the United States billions of dollars and 4,486 lives so far—not to mention the intangible and indirect costs from the invasion and post-war occupation—may immediately laud the administration for its extra cautious approach toward Syria.

 

But how much caution is too much? Is Washington being so careful on Syria that it risks undermining U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East?

 

As things currently stand, the two main U.S. priorities for Syria, containing the civil war and securing the regime’s WMD, are more or less fulfilled. The risk of chemical-weapons loss or usage in Syria is relatively low because Syrian president Bashar al-Assad is not facing a mortal threat—at least not yet. And the sectarian violence inside the country has not furiously spilled over to neighboring countries—again, not yet.

 

An Agenda for Washington

 

Does the present calm mean that the United States can afford to watch from afar and do the bare minimum in Syria? Assad may be in good shape now, and the balance of power currently may be tilted in favor of his forces, but several developments could change the dynamics inside Syria in the not so distant future and undermine U.S. priorities there.

 

Neighboring Turkey is starting to get worried about its own security. The recent firing by Syrian soldiers into a refugee camp inside Turkey (Turkey hosts thousands of Syrian refugees), killing two, has raised the prospects of Turkish military action, with prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan calling for NATO intervention. And it is only a matter of time before Saudi Arabia, Qatar and other neighboring countries actually deliver on their promises to supply the Syrian rebels with substantial amounts of money and modern weaponry. Unsurprisingly, Kofi Annan’s peace plan has failed to stop the violence, thus boosting the chances that military options will be seriously entertained by neighboring countries.

 

The reality is that a full-blown civil war in Syria is in the works, one that will surely change U.S. priorities in the country. Thus, Washington cannot afford to lead from behind. It is smart to repeat that Syria is not Libya in advancing an argument against military intervention. But it is precisely because Syria is not Libya that Washington cannot merely state its concerns and hope for the best. Unlike in Libya, the stakes in Syria are high, and the United States must take charge, although that does not necessarily mean boots on the ground, another Libya-like aerial campaign or other military options.

 

Washington’s reactive Syria strategy is at risk of being overrun by events on the ground. A more proactive strategy is desperately needed, one that entails tough bargaining and creative diplomacy with the Russians. The United States needs to know what it would take for Russia to abandon the Syrian regime. If it is continued access to the port of Tartous and business opportunities, as well as healthy trade and strategic relations with the next Syrian government, then so be it. The administration should get it on paper and have the Syrian opposition sign off. There also should be frank discussions about the U.S. policy of NATO expansion.

 

This high-stakes negotiation with Moscow will obviously not be just about Syria. It will be about the future of the Middle East and U.S. strategic interests—oil, Israel, stability and democracy promotion—in that vital part of the world. Maybe the price of Russian cooperation is higher than this, but it’s high time Washington negotiates with Moscow in a serious fashion.

 

If Assad loses Moscow as a friend at the UN Security Council, things will get much tougher for him at home. Russia’s change of position could well be the trigger for some real defections in the Syrian government. Yet domestic politics in Washington and Moscow could stand in the way of a more aggressive U.S. diplomatic strategy. Will Barack Obama risk raising the stakes on Syria before November and talk tough with Vladimir Putin? Will Putin play ball at a time when he is trying to reassert himself on the international stage and show domestic opponents that he can defy Washington? It’s possible but not inevitable—and only an offensive diplomatic strategy can keep the possibility open.

 

 

Photo: International Herald Tribune.

 

How to assess progress in the Iran nuclear talks

By Chen Kane – I have been thinking lately about ways to assess progress in the nuclear talks with Iran. Yes, handshakes here and there and a “pleasant atmosphere” won’t cut it for me. Here is a very good piece in the New York Times by our colleagues at Carnegie  that does the job quite nicely.

 

 

Since the negotiations are expected to be long and highly uncertain, Mark  Hibbs, Ariel Levite and George Perkovitch provide us with some good benchmarks to measure progress:

The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and the Middle East

By Chen Kane – The 2012 Nuclear Security Summit was held in South Korea in March 2012. This is the second summit, following the one held in Washington DC in April 2010.  Both summits focused on how to safeguard weapons-grade plutonium and uranium to prevent nuclear terrorism. Eleven areas of priority in nuclear security were identified and presented with specific actions in each area. The 11 areas are – the global nuclear security architecture, the role of the IAEA, nuclear materials, radioactive sources, nuclear security and safety, transportation security, combating illicit trafficking, nuclear forensics, nuclear security culture, information security, and international cooperation.

 

From the Middle East, heads of 8 states participated in the summit – Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and the UAE. Impressive representation for a region in which very few countries have advanced nuclear infrastructures or capabilities.  The region has only one operating nuclear power reactor (in Iran) and 14 research reactors (in Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey).

 

                                                                           (According to the IAEA Research Reactor Database)

 

 

Most countries participating in the summit announced their voluntary national commitments. Some good commitments came from the region:

 

Algeria committed to updating its domestic regulations to strengthen nuclear security, joining the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), and establishing a Nuclear Security Training and Support Center.

 

Egypt committed to establishing an independent authority for controlling nuclear materials and to organizing a regional workshop on IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database.

 

Israel completed the repatriation of US-origin HEU spent fuel from Soreq research reactor, and committed to ratifying the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), to ratifying the 2005 Amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), and to continuing operating the Megaport Initiative.

 

Jordan committed to creating a counter nuclear smuggling team.

 

Morocco ratified the 2005 Amended CPPNM, and committed to enhancing border control and national capacity to detect illicit trafficking. It also committed to adopting a new legislation on nuclear and radiological safety and security which envisages the establishment of an independent authority for nuclear safety and security, as well as establishing a center of excellence.

 

Saudi Arabia established a center of excellence and pledged to contribute $500,000 to the UN Security Council 1540 Committee.

 

Turkey committed to ratifying the 2005 Amended CPPNM and the ICSANT; inviting the IAEA’s International Physical Protection Advisory Service for a follow-up review, and drafting a new regulation on the physical protection of the nuclear facilities and nuclear material.

 

United Arab Emirates issued new regulations related to nuclear security and committed to establishing a regulatory infrastructure regarding the management of radioactive material.

 

Kuwait’s nuclear energy aspirations

By Bilal Y. Saab – Two years ago we learned that Kuwait, the 5th biggest oil producer among OPEC members, was planning to build 4 nuclear power reactors by 2022. They won’t be the first, the UAE already has a civilian nuclear energy program, unique in the Arab world (many call it the model for the region), and Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia are thinking carefully about their nuclear options and planning accordingly. I am sure Qatar is in that list of nuclear hopefuls too.

 

 

According to a September 09, 2010 Bloomberg story, each proposed plant in Kuwait would carry 1,000 megawatts. Sounds like an awful lot to me for such a small country of roughly 3 million people, unless you want to light up Kuwait city as if it’s 4th of July every day. But I am not a technical expert so I will defer to colleagues at CNS.  The motivation? Primarly energy supply deficiencies in the state of Kuwait. Yes, despite their oil and financial resources, they do have severe power outages in the summer, and for the life of me, I don’t understand how that could be. But again, I am no expert, you can read the Bloomberg story again, it partly explains why. The other motivation is regional and international prestige. They do have the money for it and see no reason why the UAE should have monopoly over this vital energy resource (read this August 2010 story too by the National). For more on the plans and thinking of Kuwait’s National Nuclear Energy Committee (KNNEC), I refer you to this powerpoint presentation, dated December 2010 in Tunis.

 

But there is a dramatic follow up to this story: Earlier this year, Kuwait made a strategic decision to abandon civilian nuclear power production. I did not see that one coming. If only Tehran can hear it. Well, the Iranians did I  am sure, but chose to ignore it. What accounts for Kuwait’s decision? Japan! That’s right, the nuclear incident at the Daiichi nucler power complex in March of last year, caused by a massive quake.

 

Kuwait is not exactly a paragon of democracy (they are way better than we all think though) but according to my sources at the Kuwaiti embassy in Washington, the Kuwaiti public did have a say in this and did affect governmental decision-making. Kuwaitis questioned the necessity of building nuclear power plants and their effects on public safety. Also, there were questions of where Kuwait would store the radiocative waste generated by the proposed plants. So what did Kuwaiti Emir Sabah Al Ahmed Al Sabah do partly in response to public questioning and concerns? He dissolved the KNNEC for months!

 

I think there is more to it here. US pressure? Maybe. But it is quite remarkable that Fukushima did not deter the UAE, their program is up and running still. So I ask this: to what extent do different domestic political conditions explain the Kuwaiti and UAE responses? Worth thinking about. But I’ll keep watching this story, it is entirely possible that Kuwait might rethink its position.

 

 

Photo: Constructionweekonline.com

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The day after Iran gets the bomb

By Bilal Y. Saab – I have been doing some work and proposal-writing lately on an issue that obviously has gotten a lot of attention over the past few years. And it is how Iran might look and behave differently if and when it gets the bomb. Like I said, tons of work has been done on the issue already but I felt like there were some limitations and gaps in the research. I tried to address some of these issues in two short pieces that appeared in Foreign Policy and the National Interest (guilty of self-promotion charges). Here they are again:

 

 

The Futility of Predicting Iran’s Future

Foreign Policy – February 02, 2012

 

When safety regulation makes automobiles safer, drivers (though obviously not all of them) are tempted to drive more recklessly, creating partially or completely offsetting effects on the overall level of safety. Economists have entertained this idea since it was first introduced by Sam Peltzman in the 1970s, some have rejected it while others, some of whom relied on data from NASCAR races, validated it. The “Peltzman effect” was also tested during the Cold War and more broadly in the realm of strategic affairs. Specifically, scholars have sought to understand the effect of the added perceived security a state acquires from nuclear weapons on its behavior in world politics.

 

 

Let us assume for a moment that Iran acquires a nuclear weapons capability (which is anything but inevitable given the many technical and political unknowns), a “nuclear seat belt or air bag” so to speak, will it behave like a more reckless driver? It is no surprise that analysts have had disagreements on this issue, some strong, others more nuanced. Most analysts however believe that a nuclear Iran — whether overtly nuclear-armed or capable of producing weapons quickly — would present an even greater challenge to Western interests and regional security than it does today, more aggressively protecting its strategic interests, projecting its power, pursuing its ideological ambitions, and meddling in the politics and security of its neighbors. A nuclear Iran could look more like Pakistan, a country that, after its 1998 nuclear tests, was feeling more confident on the regional and international stage and was arguably taking more risks in its policies toward its historical rival, India.

 

A more optimistic view of how a nuclear Iran would look and conduct itself in world politics suggests that mere possession of the bomb does not necessarily lead to a foreign policy of aggression and bellicosity. Despite its idiosyncratic features, ideological motivations and political instability, a nuclear Iran could resemble China, a country that, in pursuit of its security and diplomatic interests, has mostly sought to deter rather than confront, cooperate rather than defy, and coexist rather than threaten (except on the issues of Taiwan’s and Tibet’s independence, which continue to be red lines for the Chinese leadership).

 

Some have also questioned the usefulness of nuclear weapons for Iran, arguing that the strategic value of this “narrow category of weapons” lies primarily in regime security and deterrence of military threats, not subversion and blackmail. According to this reasoning, nuclear weapons are likely to work against goals of regional hegemony because of unintended effects such as an escalation of the Middle East arms race and a powerful U.S. response. One analyst went as far as to say that nuclear gambits simply do not work. While Iran may have a freer hand in regional politics and be able to expand its influence in the Middle East, a nuclear weapons capability is more likely to tame it, given its interest in avoiding escalation with other nuclear power states such as the United States and Israel. In sum, those less worried about the global security repercussions of a nuclear Iran maintain that the threat is “overblown.”

 

Analysts have tried to predict the behavior of a nuclear Iran and have tailored their policy recommendations for the United States accordingly. They have relied on two approaches. The first, which borrows heavily from the logic of theories of nuclear proliferation and studies investigating the effects of nuclear weapons on a state’s foreign policy, makes inferences about the behavior of a nuclear Iran after looking at patterns of behavior by other nuclear weapons states. For example, if China, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and other nuclear weapons states followed similar courses of action after they obtained the bomb, Iran is more likely to follow suit. However, there are two obvious problems with this first approach: first, these states to begin with, did not behave similarly after they got the bomb. For example, China behaved more responsibly than North Korea and India much more to reassure the world about its intentions and capabilities and to safeguard its nuclear arsenal than did Pakistan. Second, even if one can find similarities in these states’ post-nuclear behaviors, it does not mean that Iran will follow a prescribed model. In other words, Iran obviously can still decide to go in a completely different direction.

 

The second approach, which is Iran-specific and somewhat more promising than the first, looks at trends in past Iranian behavior in regional and international crises and militarized disputes and attempts to make inferences about future behavior. For example, if evidence is found suggesting that Iran refrained more often than not from escalating during past crises and showed restraint when confronted with overwhelming force, the assumption is that it is more likely to do the same in the future. Indeed, if Iran acted “rationally” and was deterred from crossing red lines in the past, then it is possible that deterrence against Iran, even if armed with nuclear weapons, will work in the future. Several examples of past Iranian experiences and policies show that Tehran can be a “rational” and pragmatic state when it wants to, including its secret purchase of weapons from the United States in the mid-1980s (part of the Iran-Contra affair), its political and military conduct during the 1980-88 war with Iraq, its behavior in the 1980s “Tankers War,” its intelligence cooperation with the United States on al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan following 9/11, its strategy toward U.S. forces operating in post-Saddam Iraq, and its response to Israel’s 2006 war against Hezbollah in Lebanon. These examples and others indicate that Iran is perfectly capable of calculating its every move, of exercising political pragmatism, of understanding the dictates of deterrence, and of keeping its ideological ambitions in check when the costs are too high.

 

However, the reliability of this second approach is also questionable. The specific constellation of political, security, psychological, and geographic factors surrounding a certain crisis in the past may not be the same in a future one. In other words, every crisis is unique, and the decision to retreat or escalate depends not just on the nature of the external security threat, but also on how it is perceived and by whom. For example, if the balance of political forces inside the Iranian political system may have tilted in favor of those seeking foreign policy restraint during crises in the past, things might change for the worse in the future, and the odds are that they will, given that the hardliners in Tehran are currently dominant and the less than flexible Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is solidifying its grip on national security policy.

 

Also, it matters greatly whether a nuclear Iran finds itself, by default or design, locked in a crisis with Israel and the United States, two nuclear weapons states, or with Saudi Arabia and Egypt, two non-nuclear weapons states. Iran will obviously feel more confident in disputes with states that do not have the bomb. But at the same time, this does not necessarily mean that Iran will be less assertive or extra prudent when facing states that are armed with nuclear weapons. The case of India and Pakistan illustrates how militarized disputes between nuclear weapons states can be less than stable. The military engagement of May-July 1999 between the two countries, the military stand-off of December 2001 to June 2002 after the terrorist operation on the Indian Parliament, and the most recent crisis following the 2008 Mumbai attacks that killed over 160 people mirrored the conflict escalation pattern for nuclear-armed states. Specifically, the leaders of both sides initiated troop mobilizations, put their militaries on alert, and proceeded to evacuate civilians from border-area villages. Perhaps the presence of a contiguous border and the territorial dispute over Kashmir makes the India-Pakistan case more escalation-prone than that of Iran and Israel who do not share a border or have disputes over territory. Yet there are factors in the Iran-Israel relationship that also make it especially unstable and at (high) risk of escalation. For a start, the Islamic republic denies Israel’s right to exist and its leaders have issued threats to exterminate the Jewish state (that such threats lack credibility does not make them any less scary, especially to Israeli national leaders). Since its creation in 1979, the Islamic republic has also sponsored terrorist attacks against Israeli interests and engaged in proxy wars with Israel through sub-state actors in the region, which it continues to arm and support politically. Such factors and a mere history of past conflict increase the likelihood that a future Iran-Israel confrontation will rapidly escalate to war irrespective of the presence of nuclear weapons.

 

In sum, theories and studies of nuclear proliferation, past policies and behaviors of other nuclear weapons states, and Iran’s own past behavior during crises and conflicts are not reliable predictors of future Iranian behavior. The arguments of the “nuclear optimists” and “nuclear pessimists” with regard to a nuclear Iran can be proven neither wrong nor right at present, they remain hypothetical forecasts. Indeed, it is impossible to know in advance how Iran will behave if it acquires a nuclear weapons capability. It is also illogical to try to demonstrate that Iranian leaders will not act in a given way at some point in the future, especially if and when they obtain the absolute weapon, the ultimate deterrent. Iran can act rationally at one given time, and irrationally at another. Different situations require different behaviors and sets of policies. Equally important, what is rational for Iran’s regime may still be unacceptable for the United States, thus rendering the whole concept of rationality less than relevant when it comes to formulating a U.S. strategic response. Therefore, analysts should stop asking themselves if a nuclear Iran would act according to a “rational actor model.

 

From a U.S. policy standpoint, the far more pertinent and perhaps challenging question that should be answered is not how a nuclear Iran is likely to behave but what strategies and contingency plans the United States should formulate in advance to effectively deal with every possible Iranian scenario. The United States cannot afford to make educated guesses about a country that may be armed with the most destructive weapons on earth, has consistently manipulated the rules of the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and concealed its nuclear capabilities, and has a long history of engaging in international terrorism and fomenting instability in neighboring countries.

 

 

No Hotline to Tehran

The National Interest – February 10, 2012

 

It is neither premature nor defeatist for the United States to start preparing for the possibility that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons. It is not inevitable. But the longer Americans wait to engage in an honest and calm debate about a nuclear-armed Iran, the less prepared they will be should that fateful day arrive.

 

Should the world be faced with the fait accompli of a nuclear Iran, the immediate reaction of the international community will be massive outrage and condemnation. The United States will be confronted with some familiar options: launch a preventive strike or accept the reality of a nuclear-armed Iran and move to a policy of Cold War–like containment and robust deterrence. This scenario prompts several questions: How would the U.S. stance toward a nuclear Iran differ from Washington’s present policy? Would the costs of containment and deterrence be significantly higher? Would a military option be completely ruled out?

 

The Conventional Attack

 

Let’s start with prevention. Launching a comprehensive attack against a nuclear Iran that seeks to physically destroy its nuclear program in full, crush its military and decapitate its political leadership is not unthinkable. But it should be obvious to all that the risks are immensely high and the costs could be intolerable for both the United States and Israel.

 

Iran would possess a relatively small nuclear arsenal in the beginning (anywhere between four and thirty-seven nukes) and no assured second-strike capability for years, making it vulnerable to a disarming raid by the United States. Yet Iran’s vulnerability could also complicate U.S. military plans. Iran may be compelled to strike first for fear of losing its few nukes, especially if it perceives that an attack is imminent. Further, Iran’s limited capabilities in command, control, communications and intelligence could also cause a hair-trigger reaction during a crisis.

 

Attacking a nuclear-armed Iran is a viable option only if Washington knows the exact number of Iran’s nuclear warheads and their locations and can ensure they will not be moved or fired before a strike. The chances that U.S. intelligence agencies will gather solid intelligence on all these variables are slim. And because nuclear weapons are relatively easy to hide and move, Iran will make sure to create operational uncertainty and strategic ambiguity, causing Washington to think twice before launching an attack. All Iran needs is the survival of one or two nukes to use against U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf or to fire at Israel. In sum, it is far from clear that a conventional attack by the United States, no matter how massive and well executed, would physically eliminate all of Iran’s nuclear weapons.

 

The Challenges of Containment

 

The elements of an alternative policy—containment and deterrence—are well-known by now. (The American Enterprise Institute’s December 2011 report, “Containing and Deterring a Nuclear Iran,” did a superb job of detailing them.) These include but are not limited to boosting defense ties with Gulf Cooperation Council states, providing them with a nuclear umbrella and deploying missile defenses on their territories, bolstering the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf, and solidifying diplomatic relations with U.S. allies in the region and within NATO.

 

The costs of this policy are also clear: An Iranian bomb would deal a huge blow to (or even totally collapse) the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, aspirations of global disarmament and the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction. The United States, whose armed forces are already stretched thin, would need to allocate significant military resources to the Persian Gulf and spend a lot of political capital convincing its Middle Eastern allies (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and possibly Qatar and the UAE) not to seek their own nuclear weapons. This would be extremely difficult.

 

But if the United States was able to protect its allies during the Cold War from nuclear blackmail by the Soviets, it can do so with a much less powerful adversary—even an Iran in possession of the bomb. But just as with the Soviet Union, the United States would need a genuinely credible deterrent posture. A nuclear Iran must believe that Washington is both able and willing to inflict massive pain on Tehran, should it misbehave.

 

What Iran’s leaders say and do immediately after they get the bomb could make a difference in how the United States reacts. Clear signaling of intentions by Iran’s leaders could tip the balance in favor of a particular U.S. response. To be sure, there may not be much difference in what Iran says and does once it acquires a nuclear-weapons capability. The United States might have already decided in favor of a military strike and the domestic, regional and international pressures might be too strong—but Iran will still have a choice to make.

 

A Cooperative Iran?

 

Consider an admittedly theoretical scenario for just a moment. A nuclear Iran could reduce the chances of an American attack if it chose to take tangible and verifiable steps to convince the United States and the rest of the world that it would be a responsible and peaceful nuclear-weapons state. It would have to convey quickly and clearly that its nuclear weapons would only serve deterrent purposes and never be used as war-fighting instruments on the battlefield or as tools for blackmail and subversion.

 

The size and nature of Iran’s nuclear arsenal will be important indicators of its intentions. Specifically, a small, safe and reliable arsenal could be less of a concern. A declaration that specifies the conditions under which Iran would use or threaten to use nuclear weapons is another major form of signaling and an indicator of intentions. A “no-first-use” policy, a clear and public articulation of “red lines,” and the publication of a nuclear doctrine could also help reduce regional and worldwide fears, and thus lower the chances of a U.S. preventive strike. The more transparent Iran decides to be about its nuclear arsenal, the more credible its case of nonaggression will be.

 

Also relevant is the manner in which Iran declares its nuclear status to the world. Test-firing a nuclear weapon like the Pakistanis and the North Koreans may be a sign of worse things to come, although the Indians and some of the other nuclear powers also test-fired their devices. Keeping the bomb in the basement, however, and never acknowledging it—as the Israelis did—would be devastating to the international nonproliferation regime, but might be better received by the United States.

 

In addition, feeling more confident about its security and deterrent capabilities, Iran could publicly renounce terrorism, refrain from blocking peace efforts in the Middle East and stop sending arms to Hezbollah. Iran might also adopt nuclear-export controls and other nonproliferation policies, which India embraced soon after it obtained the bomb, and state its desire to participate in international arrangements to prevent or restrict sensitive flows from its civilian nuclear program.

 

Should a nuclear Iran decide to follow a pacific course—an outcome that is highly doubtful—the United States might shelve, but not take off the table, the option of a preventative strike, opting instead for a policy of containment and deterrence. But there is also the far more likely scenario: Iran chooses not to take the aforementioned course, thus raising the incentives of the United States to strike.

 

Communication Breakdown

 

Early signs of hostile Iranian intentions could include the production of a large nuclear arsenal that incorporates tactical nukes and the development of new military capabilities, such as an intercontinental ballistic missile, that directly threaten the United States and its allies. A rejection of a “no-first-use” principle or an ambiguous declaratory policy that leaves world governments guessing about Iranian intentions could also precipitate U.S. preventive action.

 

Iran could also leverage its nuclear status for political advantage, initiating crises directly or by proxy and escalating a conventional conflict. And should Iran find itself losing a conflict with a rival or enemy nation on the conventional battlefield, it could always resort to the nuclear option. Indeed, the introduction of battlefield nuclear weapons might be a tactic pursued as a last, desperate means of ensuring survival. Other signs of bellicose intentions by a nuclear Iran that could provoke a U.S. military response are a major terrorist attack against Western interests, forward troop deployments along its borders, comprehensive and aggressive military training exercises and simulations with live ammunition, and threats directed at U.S. allies.

 

Even if a nuclear Iran chooses to pacify the world, it must effectively communicate its peaceful intentions. Obviously this is easier said than done. For a start, Iran’s diplomatic skills are weak and its political system is factionalized. Indeed, Tehran has a record of obscuring its intentions and concealing its capabilities, and its civilian, religious and military leaders seldom speak with one voice on foreign affairs.

 

There is no U.S.-Iranian hotline. Diplomatic relations between Iran and its two primary enemies, the United States and Israel, do not even exist. Sending crucial messages to the United States through the Swiss channel is not ideal and cannot be a substitute for direct interaction, especially during times of nuclear crisis. The United States and its allies will not give Iran, a country whose credibility is already very low, the benefit of the doubt. There will not be an effort to understand whether Iran is failing to communicate due to unwillingness, incapacity or both; the United States and its allies will just assume and prepare for the worst.

 

Despite what could be good intentions, Iran may not be technically capable of safeguarding its nuclear arsenal and keeping it under centralized command and control. Assessing the Iranian regime’s ability to secure its nuclear weapons is a trying exercise, due to its notoriously opaque nature and the lack of good intelligence on the country’s national-security apparatus. Moreover, some rogue elements within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps or the political elite could be tempted to supply nuclear technology to friends and allies, a remote possibility given the huge risks and high costs. Irrespective of what Iran says and does, all these objective risks may be viewed by the United States as too high—and ample reason to opt for a preventive strike.

 

Washington will theoretically have two distinct options should Iran go nuclear: prevention or containment and deterrence. But in reality there will be a strong connection between the two. Indeed, the feasibility of one will depend on the other. For containment to succeed, the United States would need a credible deterrent in the eyes of Iran. A credible deterrent, on the other hand, will require a real first-strike preventive option. In other words, prevention will complement containment. Whether the United States will be able to develop viable preventive and containment options is hard to predict. But preparation for a nuclear Iran should start today, not tomorrow.

 

 

 

US missile defense collaboration with Gulf states

By Bilal Y. Saab – In this March 30 report by the Washington Post, we learn that US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has proposed improved collaboration with Gulf Arab states on maritime security and missile defense to counter potential threats from Iran.

 

Not much new there, US-GCC relations are old, strategic and continue to be “rock solid” (to quote Clinton) — except —- that Washington is now starting what will be a long-term process of dealing with GCC allies on a more multilateral basis (yes, bilateral relations with the Saudis will still be paramount, although Qatar is high up there now). It will still take an enormous amount of diplomatic work to switch the format of US relations with the Arab Gulf, but if you read the statements of US officials you can be positive that it is happening. The driver of this strategy? The Iranian missile threat, no doubt.

 

 

One of the fruits that could come out of this new US strategy is a regional (GCC) missile defense system for the Arab Gulf. But even the most inexperienced analyst of military affairs and missile defenses knows the gigantic (financial, technical, operational, military) challenges of missile defenses, let alone region-wide systems. Talk about a bold and ambitious plan by Washington. Sure the Gulf states will pay the bill (these things cost a fortune), but these systems are no panacea when it comes to improving security or meeting the asymmetric military challenge of Iran. There is no need to repeat the old problems of missile defenses here but very briefly Iran can very easily overwhelm them with a barrage of missiles and decoys. Also, will the systems defend military assets or population centers? Once it becomes region-wide (which could take a while), who will man the systems? US or Gulf personnel? I expect the former but if the latter, how will Gulf states create a region-wide command and control center? Most likely with the help of the United States. Will the Saudis have the upper hand given their clout in the GCC? Don’t forget that the Saudis already have US Patriot systems on their territory. The Kuwaitis too. The Emiratis have the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system (for more on missile defenses, see Victoria Samson’s American Missile Defense)

 

Is a new regional security architecture for the Middle East in the works? Hardly. We have heard that before. It might be less challenging to start with a GCC archiecture, but extending that to the wider Middle East, in the absence of regional peace with Israel, is a thing of fiction, at least for now.  

 

 

Photo: AFP Photo / Fayez Nureldine

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Arab science & technology and arms control

By Bilal Y. Saab – What is the state of science and technology in the Arab world and the broader Middle East? How does science and technology relate to the promotion and development of good practices of arms control?

 

 

The global arms control experience and record so far show without any doubt the crucial and increasing role of civil society and the scientific community in the arms control process. Just think of it this way: government officials, diplomats and bureaucrats often lack the knowledge about certain types of weapons systems and their effects and need the input of civilian experts and medical doctors (if it’s biological or chemical agents) outside government. Long story short, scientific cooperation and integration into the arms control process is paramount.

 

Should a serious arms control process be re-laucnhed in the Middle East, what role will Arab, Turkish, Iranian, Kurdish, and Israeli scientists play (or be allowed to play)? It might be premature to guess at present given the uncertainties of two developements: One, the Arab uprising and the extent to which it will open up political processes in all countries undergoing transitions. Two, whether or not the 2012 Middle East WMD-free conference will happen, as it is the perfect opportunity to resume the interrupted arms control process in the region. Also don’t forget that the region is not excatly stellar in the sciences. So that by itself is an objective limitation, which hopefully can be remedied with political and economic changes sweeping the region. I urge you to check out the works of my former Brookings colleagues (also good friends) Kristin Lord and Steve Grand on the state of S&T in the Arab world. Kristin has moved on to CNAS and is now director of studies there. She is a terrific scholar of public diplomacy and things that actually matter.

 

For now, I leave you with a nice piece by Chen, co-author/editor of this blog, on the role of civil society in arms control.

 

 

Photo: BioBusiness.

 

 

Israeli public supports a nuclear-free Middle East

By Bilal Y. Saab – Former Brookings colleague Shibley Telhami and his co-workers conducted a poll of Israelis on their attitudes toward a Middle East Nuclear Free Weapons Zone. 64% of Israeli jews favor the establishment of a Middle East free of nuclear weapons.

 

 

This is quite remarkable. I am not sure how much impact it will have on actual Israeli policy or even the policy debate itself (polling is an imperfect science and one could question the methodolgy not just of this poll but of polling in general), but it is still very interesting. Add to that the recent popular movements in Israel and Iran promoting peace and love between the two countries and you’ve got some people power, or at least a not insignificant voice in Israel and Iran calling for reducing tensions and averting war.

 

But back to the Israeli public opinion poll. It needs to be placed in its proper context, as all polls should. I like how Anshel Pfeffer explains it in Haaretz. He says that when it comes to Israeli opinions about an Israeli strike against Iran, there are three categories:

 

About a third favors a strike against Iran under almost any circumstance – with or without the blessing of Barack Obama’s administration. Another third opposes a strike, almost unconditionally. This is the section of the public that is responsible for the and YouTube campaigns pledging love to Iran and promising Iranians that Israel will not bomb them. And there is a third of Israelis who are undecided; they believe that a strike is probably inevitable, but are afraid of the repercussions and want the Israeli government to do everything possible to ensure U.S. support before carrying it out.    

 

But one must fight his way through an almost impenetrable thicket of polls to reach even this level of clarity.    

 

The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs (JCPA) released a poll last week showing that a clear majority of Israelis (65 percent) believe a strike against the Iranian nuclear facilities would be preferable to accepting an Islamic Republic which has a military nuclear capability. Sixty percent said that only an attack could stop Iran’s nuclear ambitions, while 37 percent believed that there are other ways of averting an Iranian bomb.    

 

A similar majority – 64 percent – are confident that the IDF can significantly damage the Iranian nuclear installations, while 63 percent assume that retaliation against Israel’s civilian front will take place regardless of who carried out the attack – Israel or the U.S.    

 

This last statistic is particularly interesting, because the very pollster who carried out the poll for JCPA is Prof. Camil Fuchs, Haaretz’ regular pollster. A couple of weeks ago, in a poll for Haaretz, he found that 58 percent of Israelis oppose an attack on Iran without American support. This would seem to indicate that while Israelis are very worried about the Iranian threat and have little faith in diplomacy and sanctions, many of them are ambiguous over the wisdom of such attack, especially one that is carried out without U.S. support.    

 

Naturally, there is some overlap between the majorities in either of Fuchs’ polls, and polling is always largely a reflection of the question’s wording by the organizations commissioning the surveys. Other polls carried out by different organizations paint an even more bewildering picture. At the end of February, the Saban Center at the Brookings Institute published a survey of Israeli public opinion carried out by the Deaf Company, which showed major reservations among the public.    

 

According to the poll, only 19 percent of Israelis would support a strike without American backing, 42 percent would be in favor of attacking only if the U.S. is on board, and 34 percent were against striking in any case. This is by far the most detailed of polls to come out recently, and it reveals that Israelis are divided on a wide range of questions such as the support that the U.S. will ultimately give Israel if it attacks, the duration of a conflict, and whether such a move would seriously delay the Iranian nuclear project. It does seem, though, that most Israelis believe an attack on Iran would almost certainly lead to a wider conflict which will include Hezbollah in Lebanon and would last for at least a few months.    

 

Fast-forward nearly a month, and there is a new survey carried out by the Truman Institute at the Hebrew University and this one has 42 percent of Israelis supporting an attack on Iran, even if Israel has to go it alone, and 69 percent favor a strike in cooperation with the Americans.    

 

Does the reason for this increase in those backing an attack lie in different polling methodology, in the specific wording of the questions in each survey, or in the fact that the respondents in the Truman poll had since heard Benjamin Netanyahu and Barack Obama’s speeches at the AIPAC conference? Maybe the pollsters have the answers.    

 

Another poll carried out by the Midgam project ten days ago for Channel 10 – also after the speeches in Washington – is much closer to the Brookings results – It has only 23 percent of Israelis in favor of a solo attack on Iran, with 56 percent against. 21 percent have no opinion (in itself a surprising statistic).    

 

Netanyahu, known as a notorious polling-junky, is fully aware of the existence and fears of the undecided and skeptical and these endless surveys prove that he still has to go some way to win over a majority of the public. He was trying to do just this in his Knesset speech earlier this month when he reiterated the absolute necessity that Israel retains the sovereign right to strike and repeated the Americans’ agreement to this, in principle.    

 

In his speech, Netanyahu mentioned Menachem Begin’s decision in 1981 to defy American opposition and bomb Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor. That operation was supported retroactively by a wide Israeli consensus, but the same wasn’t true of Begin’s next military initiative, which Netanyahu did not mention in his speech – the first Lebanon war. While a majority of the public initially supported Operation Peace in Galilee, as the IDF became increasingly bogged down in the Lebanese mud, the support eroded and the Lebanon war went down in history as Israel’s first Milchemet Breira – “a war of choice.”    

 

If the prime minister has indeed decided on embarking on a war with Iran, he will have to continue to do everything in his power to win over the undecided third’s support for his position that this is a Milchemet ein-breira – “a war of no choice.”

 

Are you confused already? Because I am.