There is no Yemeni model for Syria

By Bilal Y. Saab – A little less than a year ago, I argued in the pages of the National Interest that one way out of the Syrian crisis (again, that was a year ago) was to try to strike a deal with Assad, keep him in power but in return he would dismantle his regime. I thought at the time that maybe the Syrian president still had some popularity among young people. Bashar could redefine himself and initiate the necessary reforms in the country in return for a fresh new start for him, a break with the past, and a peaceful resolution of the crisis. I never said it was easy or without challenges and uncertainties, after all, the regime is his family, so removing the regime means essentially breaking with members of his family.  But I also thought it would be a good deal for the United States. Washington would secure its security interests because Assad is predictable in foreign policy and ensure a democratic transition in the country if Assad played ball. I even was called upon by personnel at the State Department to further discuss my idea (those people shall remain nameless of course). Today, of course, it is too late for that proposal. Assad has too much blood on his hands, and as far as we know, his popularity is rock bottom.

 

 

A few weeks ago, we all heard this idea of a “Yemeni model” for Syria being floated around by Washington and Moscow. It is essentially the reverse of what I proposed a year ago. Instead of telling the regime to go, this model asks Assad to step down in return for keeping the regime. If my idea at the time was not practical or smart (I still think it was an opportunity that Bashar should have taken), this Yemeni model is ten times dumber and more dangerous. I rip it apart in this roundtable that appeared in Foreign Policy. Here it is below.

 

 

 

 

In an attempt to find a solution to the Syrian crisis, the United States and Russia appear to be discussing a diplomatic option, modeled on the U.S.-led political transition in Yemen, that ensures the departure of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, his family, and perhaps a few of his close associates but keeps his regime intact. Let us save Washington and Moscow the trouble of having to think through this latest proposal, known in diplomatic circles as “the Yemenskii Variant”: It is a very bad idea that will make things worse.

 

First, while this proposal, albeit with major modifications and conditions that guarantee a democratic future for Syria, could have been entertained during the first weeks of the uprising, 14 months and more than 13,000 deaths later is simply too late. The bloodshed is too extreme, and Assad must be held accountable. And any theory of him not being in charge or not having ordered this brutal crackdown is utter nonsense. Assad is the head of the Syrian government and — as far as we know — all major decisions, including management of the uprising, are made by him and members of his family.

 

Second, the Syrian people should be consulted first and foremost. It is one thing to try to stop the carnage and save lives in Syria, but quite another to do it without respecting the long-term aspirations of the Syrian people. Who said that the Syrian people would be on board with keeping a murderous regime that has massacred them on a daily basis? Of course, it is a challenge to know precisely how the Syrian people wish to achieve their goals of freedom, security, and prosperity. Those who speak for the people — the Syrian opposition — are hardly coherent or united. There may not be consensus or unanimity among Syrians on how to move forward. Nevertheless, there is something terribly wrong about the notion of foreign powers planning the future of a people they wish to rescue without their endorsement.

 

Third, the plan is highly immoral. Diplomacy should seek to end the violence in Syria, but certainly not at the expense of justice. History shows that diplomacy is most effective when it is just and rooted in morality. The Syrian people, like their Egyptian counterparts, deserve to see their tyrannical ruler stand before them and face punishment for his crimes. Without justice, there is no reconciliation, and thus any post-Assad political order that preserves the outgoing president’s regime is a recipe for continued conflict. For Syrian society to be given a chance to heal, all sects and communal groups must come together and collectively build a better future.

 

Preserving an oppressive and minority-led regime means that the Alawites will retain their political dominance over others, a condition that is guaranteed to cause more sectarian violence and further alienate the Sunnis, who represent the majority of Syrian society. While former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh personified the state in his country, Assad is not the only problem in Syria. It is the fascist and security-oriented regime that the Baathists built in 1963 and Hafez al-Assad — Bashar’s father — remodeled in 1970. Syria needs new leaders, but it also needs a new system and a new identity and role in international society.

 

Fourth, has anybody called Bashar and asked him if he is willing to play ball? Given the alliance between Damascus and Moscow, one would assume that Russian President Vladimir Putin has phoned his Syrian counterpart and asked him how he would feel about packing his and his family’s bags in return for his life. Even if he did, there is reason to believe that Assad will reject this offer for one simple reason: He thinks he is winning. His regime has yet to face a significant security or political threat and the balance of power, despite the rebels’ receipt of more modern weapons recently from neighboring countries, still tilts heavily in the government’s favor.

 

One can understand why Russia would favor the Yemeni model for Syria. Moscow does not really need Assad to preserve its strategic interests in Syria and the Middle East. All it wants is a Syrian government that allows it to use the port of Tartous for access to the Mediterranean Sea, that purchases Russian arms, and that maintains trade relations. Assad is expendable as long as his successors stay the course on relations with Russia.

 

How could the United States even be thinking about this exit strategy, which does nothing to address the roots of the uprising or hold anyone accountable for the crackdown? The stakes in Syria are too high to resort to solutions on the cheap, especially when such solutions are more likely to make things worse and lead to the same unintended consequences that top U.S. officials have been warning about: a full-blown civil war that engulfs parts of the Middle East, further Islamist radicalization of Syrian society that could open new doors for al Qaeda, and a generally chaotic and violent environment in which chemical weapons — suspected to be held in large quantities by the regime — are either lost, used or both.

 

Kofi Annan’s U.N.-backed plan has served its goal of exposing the Syrian regime before the world. But that was all anyone could realistically hope of Annan’s mission. Now, the United States should pursue tough talks and bargain with Russia to find a solution that respects the hopes and interests of the Syrian people — not a short-term solution that betrays the Syrian people and undermines U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.

 

It’s time for real and serious negotiations with Russia over not just Syria but a range of Middle Eastern issues of concern to both countries. But the Yemenskii Variant is not it.

 

 

Photo: Al Arabiya File Photo.

 

 

 

Jihadis in Syria: separating myth from reality

By Bilal Y. Saab – Most of my recent media interventions have addressed the issue of al-Qaeda’s likely role and presence in Syria. Because we do not have accurate intelligence on this issue we should avoid definitive judgments. But we can get closer to the truth once we start asking the right questions. Questions like “who was behind the recent terrorist attacks in Syria” or “is al-Qaeda involved in Syria?” are not helpful. The answers to those two questions – unclear, perhaps – will not take us very far. The right question that should be asked is: “what is the nature of the al-Qaeda threat in Syria?” With a proper assessment and diagnosis of the problem we better understand the extent to which jihadis are involved in Syria. My bottom line is that whatever presence al-Qaeda has in Syria, it is likely to be small but still deadly. We are not dealing with a large insurgent movement that has widespread societal support and control over territory. Instead, I suspect we are dealing with a few (but elite) al-Qaeda operatives who may have formed some cells to create havoc. Things could change however if two variables materialize: one, sectarian fighting reaches new highs; two, al-Qaeda’s central leadership decides to invest in the Levant and specifically in the Syrian uprising.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I summarize my thoughts in today’s piece in The National Interest.

 

Is Al Qaeda involved in the Syrian uprising? It is a controversial and hotly debated issue in Washington. But if U.S. policy makers do not properly understand and diagnose the terrorist group’s influence and role in the Syrian conflict, Washington could pursue a detrimental course of action and hurt U.S. strategic interests in the Middle East.

 

A Murky Picture

 

There is reason to believe that the Syrian government is behind recent terrorist attacks that killed dozens of people.

 

First, the Assads have a record of cooperating with terrorists to fight common enemies. Hafez, the late Syrian president and father of the current president Bashar, collaborated with violent Palestinian and Lebanese groups during the 1980s and 1990s to check Israel, and Bashar did the same with transnational jihadis in Iraq throughout the post-2003 U.S. occupation in an attempt to bleed U.S. forces.

 

Second, part of Bashar’s survival strategy, other than relying on the Russians and the Chinese to back him up at the United Nations Security Council, is to convince the world and especially the United States he is fighting terrorists. Launching terrorist attacks could not only bolster his claim but also frighten protestors and paralyze undecided Christians and others who are extremely wary of total, Iraq-style chaos in the country.

 

These compelling reasons notwithstanding, definitive judgments should be avoided. The sophistication, technical proficiency and lethality of the Damascus bombings smack of Al Qaeda-style terrorism. Also, border insecurity, increased Islamist radicalization of the uprising, the operational capabilities of Al Qaeda franchises in the region and weak Syrian state capacity (despite the notorious power of its intelligence services) make it possible that Al Qaeda was involved, possibly with armed rebels who might have formed a devil’s pact with the terror group to defeat Assad. The picture is so murky that even America’s top military official, Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, said he was not entirely sure of the extent to which Al Qaeda is involved inSyria.

 

A Weak Franchise

 

Yet while accurate intelligence on Al Qaeda’s role in Syria is currently lacking, historical trends and Levantine realities militate against the possibility of the terrorist organization creating an insurgent movement and an Islamic emirate in Syria.

 

First, Al Qaeda has no real partners it can count on to fulfill its goals of expanding in theLevant and fightingIsrael. Small groups such as Jund al-Sham, Fatah al Islam, Jund Ansar Allah and now Jabhat al-Nusra (which recently claimed responsibility for the Damascus bombings) are nothing like what Al Qaeda in Iraq once was—or what Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula is today. These small groups lack organizational coherence, human and material resources, and fighting capabilities. Thus, they were never fit to serve as Al Qaeda franchises in the Levant. Members of these groups can best be described as freelance jihadi fighters with no proven dedication to Al Qaeda’s cause.

 

Second, despite the increased Islamist radicalization of the Syrian uprising and its spillover to Lebanon’s northern region, Al Qaeda’s takfiri ideology does not have a strong popular following or support base in most of the Levant.

 

Third, Iran continues to dominate the politics of the Levant, leaving little room for Al Qaeda to mobilize and conduct its business. Despite talk among some experts about a cozy relationship between Iran and Al Qaeda, the truth is that Tehran works to prevent the terrorist group from expanding into what it considers its own sphere of influence, projecting Shia values and norms and sponsoring not only Shia but also Sunni groups in the area.

 

Fourth, their desire to harm Israel and liberate Jerusalem notwithstanding, Al Qaeda’s core leaders, including the late Osama Bin Laden and his successor Ayman al-Zawahri, have never been clear about the organization’s mission in the Levant. Al-Zawahiri recently called for war to oust Assad, but the region rarely has featured in his messages and directives or those of other senior Al Qaeda leaders. Things could change, however, with the recent release of Al Qaeda ideologue Abu Musab al-Suri from a Syrian prison. Some say he was freed by the regime to do its bidding and lend further credence to the notion that Al Qaeda has infiltrated the rebellion. Regardless of the circumstances of his release, al-Suri will play an active role in convincing his fellow travelers in Yemen, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan that the Syrian uprising presents a unique opportunity to establish a strong base in the Levant.

 

Starting Small

 

It will take a new strategic approach and an enormous amount of effort by Al Qaeda to create a durable and solid presence inSyria and the Levant. The strategy allegedly adopted so far by the terrorist organization for the region—going for smaller, underground terrorist cells as opposed to larger, overt insurgent movements—is arguably working, and there is no evidence to suggest it will change. Al Qaeda cells operate in Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinian Territories and now possibly Syria, and they can be activated whenever the need arises. These cells may not win widespread support or gain control over territory, but they surely can create enough damage to cause massive instability. Al Qaeda’s central leadership seems to have decided that for now it can live with that tradeoff.

 

Whatever presence Al Qaeda may have in Syria is likely to be small but may still be deadly.Syria could turn into another Iraq, especially if sectarian violence reaches new highs and Ayman al-Zawahiri and his senior partners decide to invest in a strategic foothold in theLevant. But Al Qaeda is not there yet—and history and regional realities suggest a large expansion is a long way off.

 

 

Photo: Reuters/Ahmed Jadallah.

 

 

 

 

 

Interview with Andrew Tabler on the Syrian conflict

By Bilal Y. Saab – The situation in Syria is rapidly deteriorating and sectarian violence has reached alarming levels. Al-Qaeda’s likely involvement in Syria is another factor that has occupied the minds of U.S. policymakers and affected their planning. Many have rightly predicted that escalation and descent into total, Iraq-style chaos was inevitable. The Syrian people are still on their own in this war against the killing machine of Syrian president Bashar Assad. But the rebels are starting to get some help from neighboring countries in the form of money, training, and weapons, as evidenced by their recent effective attacks against government forces. Will the flow of arms complicate things futher in Syria? Is it too late to save Syria?

 

To get a better sense of events in Syria, I sat down today with Andrew Tabler, Senior Fellow at the Washington Institute, and asked him a few questions about developments and likely prospects in Syria. Mr. Tabler is the author of In The Lion’s Den: An Eyewitness Acccount of Washington’s Battle with Assad’s Syria (Lawrence Hill Books: 2011) and former editor and co-founder of the magazine Syria Today. Mr. Tabler has conducted extensive field research in Syria over the past few years and has offered expert advice to executive and legislative bodies in the U.S. government on Syria policy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1- Is the Syrian conflict reaching a turning point with the upswing in violence and the suicide bombings?

 

Yes, “third party” actors, including at least one jihadist extremist group, Jabhat al-Nusra, are taking advantage of the battle between the Assad regime and the opposition. These groups are not the Syrian opposition, although they share the same short-term goal of hurting the Assad regime in return for its brutal suppression of protestors and the opposition as a whole. Interestingly, however, it appears the video supposedly showing Jabhat al-Nusra claiming the massive twin blasts on May 9 was a forgery. The group has denied the video’s authenticity as well. This indicates the regime may be instigating a program to discredit the opposition.

 

2- Is Syria turning into an international security problem, not just a domestic and regional one?

 

The regime’s non-compliance with the Annan Plan, and the international community’s inaction when Assad ignored its April deadlines for a cease fire and withdrawal of military units from population centers indicate that what was once a civil and armed insurrection is morphing into a civil and armed insurgency. Given the sectarian makeup of Syria, and what is strategically at stake in that country, that conflict is likely to draw in regional powers with scores to settle. That storm, so to speak, in the heart of the Middle East and in a country with one of the region’s largest chemical and biological weapons programs, is currently one of the most prominent Western and regional security issues current under discussion. So far, no easy answers from any side.

 

 

3- Now that the Syrian rebels are starting to receive more modern weaponry allegedly from neighboring countries, do you think this new development will have an immediate impact on the balance of power on the ground?

 

It depends on the nature of the weapons. The Syrian armed opposition wants anti-tank and other modern weapons. Recent Free Syrian Army activity against Syrian forces in Rastan and elsewhere indicate the opposition is at least getting enough RPGs to continue to damage Syrian armor. It is unclear if they are getting what they are asking for, but the seizure of a ship bound for Tripoli, Lebanon from Libya that contained arms and ammunition shows that the opposition and its regional supporters are not relying on the United Nations or the international community to save them. Over time, more sophisticated weapons, plus the regime’s slow economic degradation and fatigue of military and security units, could tip the balance in favor of the opposition. But that would take some time.

 

4- What do you make of the proposition that al-Qaeda is involved in Syria? Do you think the rebels are aware of the risks of potentially cooperating with al-Qaeda? Have the lessons of Iraq been learned in Syria?

 

They are aware that these groups are in Syria, and they know to keep their distance. But is every Syrian whose loved ones were killed or tortured or both going to take the high road and keep away from extremist groups? No. The longer this conflict goes on, and the longer the United States takes a hands-off approach to the opposition “within Syria” the more those who do not share American long-term goals will take advantage of the situation.

 

5- Where do we go from here in terms of U.S. policy?

 

Given the regime’s degree of non-compliance with the Annan plan, a Plan B developed by the “core group” of the Friends of the Syrian People alliance could push Assad to “step aside” sooner rather than later. This involves backing the domestic opposition and preparing for some kind of military “kick” that is likely to be necessary to accelerate Assad’s departure, or bare minimum, get the Alawites and other minorities around the regime to kick him out. Research and preparations for Plan B are well underway, but it remains unclear what course of action the Administration will choose.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Iran, human rights, and the US-Bahrain arms deal

By Matthew Sugrue – In an effort to contain Iran, U.S. policy makers have decided to move forward with some elements of a previously frozen arms sale to Bahrain.

 

According to the Financial Times, Washington will sell “air-to-air missiles, components for F-16 fighter jets and potentially a naval frigate” to the small Arab nation, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet. In light of a violent government crackdown on popular revolts last spring and ongoing allegations of further abuse, the transaction will not include equipment that could be readily used for crowd control, including “humvees, TOW missiles, tear gas, stun grenades, small arms and ammunition.”

 

 

 

In a May 11 statement, the U.S. State Department announced:

 

 

We are concerned about excessive use of force and tear gas by [the Bahraini] police. At the same time, we are concerned by the almost daily use of violence by some protestors. We urge all sides to work together to end the violence and refrain from incitement of any kind, including attacks on peaceful protestors or on the Bahraini police.

 

 

It is commendable that the United States is not selling weapons systems that can, and probably would, be used by the Bahraini government against its people. However, the U.S. State Department release is weak in condemning the actions of Manama in crushing the protest movement.

 

 

It has been suggested that recent progress on the arms sale is part of an effort to bolster the political position of the reformist-minded Crown Prince Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa. Unfortunately, these measures do not go far enough for those interested in promoting human rights in the region. “It’s a direct message [from the U.S.] that we support the authorities and we don’t support democracy in Bahrain, we don’t support protesters in Bahrain,” said Bahraini activist Mohammed Al Maskati to the Christian Science Monitor.

 

 

The U.S.-Bahrain arms sale is part of a wider U.S. strategy to contain Iran. In 2010, the United States moved forward with a controversial $60 billion sale of weaponry to Saudi Arabia, despite its own terrible human rights record. It is difficult not to consider the Bahrain sale in light of recent news on the possible delisting of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MeK) from the U.S. State Department’s terrorism list.

 

 

A recent Wall Street Journal article on the activity surrounding the MeK stated that “a judge ordered the State Department to review the MeK’s status nearly two years ago, and congressional rules maintain the process should take only 180 days.” The timing of the MeK’s delisting could easily be seen as designed to provide a one-two punch to Iran; removing sanctions from a hostile group and arming a hostile government.

 

 

Unfortunately, both actions provide Iran with justification for being non-committal in the upcoming talks regarding its nuclear program. It is in the strategic interest of theUnited States that the talks produce a working agreement for a continued dialogue around Iran’s nuclear program.

 

 

It is wise for the United States to adopt containment as a strategy against Iran and refrain from direct military action, but Washington should also be careful not to find itself on the wrong side of self determination, its own ideals, and its own best rational interests.

 

 

 

Matthew Sugrue is a Senior Coordinator for Organizational Advancement at NAFSA: Association of International Educators. He previously served at the Arms Control Association and the National Iranian American Council.

 

 

 

 

 

The 2012 Middle East Conference: Are we there yet?

By Chen Kane – The Finnish Undersecretary of State Ambassador Jaakko Laajava, also the current Facilitator of the 2012 Middle East Conference, presented his interim report on May 8, 2012 to the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). It was Laajava’s first official statement since he was nominated to convene the 2012 Middle East Conference.

 

 

It should come as no surprise to those who heard him last month, and followed his extensive visits to the region, that he is struggling to secure agreement by the major regional players to participate in the conference, let alone agree to an agenda or desired outcome for the conference.

 

For those who have not followed the 2012 Conference saga on a daily basis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and I prepared for CNS a “Questions and Answers” document highlighting important details about the 2012 Conference (see below).

 

I must say I admire the courageous decision of Ambassador Laajava to become the facilitator. It is a thankless job in the midst of an unforgiving region. Laajava is about to start with additional rounds in the region to try to get an agreement on the agenda, the desired outcome, exact timing, and the participants of the conference.

 

Here are few ideas that could be helpful for his consultation and planning the event:

 

* Countries in the region have not met for over 15 years (since ACRS), and some of them did not show up or were not invited to ACRS in the 1990s (Iran, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon). There is a great deal of diplomatic steam that needs to be released. States will need time to give “national” statements and speak about their concerns, and threat perceptions. This is crucial – if they don’t do this at the beginning of the conference, they will do it throughout the meeting, and that is bad.

 

* While countries in the region may not be willing to work together cooperatively right now, they may be willing to take unilateral steps that enhance regional security.

 

* It would be best to start with the technical issues, the region is not ready to solve the political-strategic issues yet, especially since governments among the major regional players are still being formed, or domestically challenged.

 

* Civil society and youth have a role to play, as they are much more willing to generate and openly express innovative ideas. Given current events in the region, these groups cannot be ignored by the newly established authorities.

 

FAQ: The 2012 Middle East Conference

 

Q. What is the 2012 Conference?

 

A. The 2010 NPT Review Conference adopted a consensus document containing an Action Plan for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. In the consensus document, the states agreed to convene a conference in 2012 “on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon states” and to appoint, in consultation with the states of the region, a facilitator.

 

Q. What Is the Facilitator Role?

 

A. In October 2011, Finland was designated as the host country for the 2012 Middle East Conference, and the Finnish Undersecretary of State Ambassador Jaakko Laajava named as the Facilitator. The facilitator was asked in the 2010 NPT final document to conduct consultations and undertake preparations for the convening of the 2012 conference to support implementation of the 1995 Middle East Resolution. He was also tasked with assisting “in implementing follow-on steps agreed at the 2012 conference” and reporting to the NPT 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings.

 

Ambassador Laajava reported on the progress of his efforts at the 2012 PrepCom. Since his appointment, he has conducted over 100 consultations with states in the Middle East, NPT depositaries and co-sponsors of the 1995 Middle East Resolution (Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States), international organizations, and civil society. According to the facilitator’s report, these consultations covered issues ranging from the scope and parameters of the future zone to verification to regional security environment. The facilitator noted that all states in the region “share the goal of establishing a zone” and many emphasize that the process is a unique opportunity to foster cooperation in the region on this matter.

 

Q. What Are the Next Steps and Challenges to Holding the 2012 Conference?

 

A. Issues that need to be agreed upon for the conference to take place include the conference agenda, desired outcome, exact timing, and participation. States so far have had divergent views about the possible agenda and what the conference should accomplish. The Arab states are anxious to see the 2012 Conference take place as a first step towards negotiations on WMDFZ in the region and implementation of the 1995 Middle East resolution. Therefore, they would like the conference to establish a formal process. Israel, however, is concerned that such a conference might lead to a “slippery slope” of negotiations on a zone, while the regional conditions Israel deems as necessary for a regional process (peaceful relations and reconciliation among all states in the region) are not present. Some officials from the NPT depositary states have mentioned a preference for a short high-level meeting, cautiously setting the expectations low.

 

Participation in the conference by all relevant states is particularly important, and there are still doubts about the attendance by Israel, Iran, and Syria. After the 2010 NPT Review Conference, Israel stated that the consensus document ignores the realities of the Middle East and that as a non-signatory to the NPT, Israel is not obligated to follow the decisions of the review conference. Subsequently, however, Israel has signaled some flexibility and engaged in consultations on the appointment of the facilitator, and later with the facilitator himself. Somewhat paradoxically, Iran also expressed a view that Israel should not be present at an NPT-mandated conference. At the 2012 NPT PrepCom session, Iran stated that the conference is “subsidiary” to the NPT process and should follow NPT procedures, which would suggest that only regional states parties to the NPT can fully participate in the 2012 Conference. Iran did not participate in the IAEA forum on a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East in November 2011, raising questions about the implications for the 2012 Conference. So far, however, none of the relevant states has definitely refused to attend the Conference.

 

Q. What Might Happen If the 2012 Conference is Delayed? What Would Be the Impact of It Not Being Held at All?

 

A. In addition to divergent views about the possible agenda and what the conference should accomplish, further factors that complicate the convening of the conference are the Arab Spring of 2011 and the accompanying political turmoil throughout the region. Ultimately, it may not prove feasible to convene the conference in 2012 or with the participation of all the relevant states.

 

Should a conference not take place at all, there is a concern that the 2015 NPT Review Conference will end without a consensus. Additionally, as part of the push to convene the conference, some Arab states have threatened, implicitly and explicitly, to reconsider their NPT membership if the 2012 Conference does not take place.

 

Q. Are There Any Other Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zones?

 

A. There is no precedent to a geographical zone that declared itself as free of all weapons of mass destruction (namely nuclear, chemical and biological). There are currently five nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZs): in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), South Pacific (Treaty of Rarotonga), Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok), Africa (Treaty of Pelindaba), and Central Asia. In addition, Mongolia has a special internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status, and the Treaty of Antarctica prohibits any military use of the continent, including nuclear. Nuclear-weapon-free zones cover the entire Southern Hemisphere, while the Central Asian NWFZ is the only one located entirely in the Northern Hemisphere.

 

Q. What Are the Common Features of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones?

 

A. Nuclear-weapon-free zones are established by legally-binding, negotiated instruments. According to the UN guidelines, all NWFZ treaties must be concluded “on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by states in the region concerned.”

 

NWFZ treaties prohibit their parties from the production, acquisition, stationing, or control over nuclear weapons, and also ban nuclear testing on their territories. The Treaty of Pelindaba explicitly prohibits nuclear weapons research and mandates the dismantlement of pre-existing nuclear weapons capabilities. All NWFZs require at a minimum verification through the IAEA safeguards, and the Central Asian NWFZ requires each of its members to implement an Additional Protocol to their comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, giving the agency added inspection authorities. Some of the NWFZ treaties require member states to implement physical protection measures in accordance with the IAEA standards, and all except the Treaty of Tlatelolco have provisions regarding nuclear export controls. The treaties of Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok prohibit sales of nuclear equipment or materials to states that do not accept IAEA safeguards on all of their nuclear activities. The Central Asian NWFZ treaty requires both comprehensive safeguards and an Additional Protocol as condition of supply of nuclear materials and equipment.

 

All NWFZ treaties have protocols that provide negative security assurances, to be ratified by the states recognized as “official” nuclear weapon states under the NPT. Under the protocols, these states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) commit not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against members of such zones. At present, only the protocol to the Treaty of Tlatelolco has been ratified by all five nuclear-weapon states.

 

 

Photo: Ronald Zak, AP

 

A turning point in the Syrian crisis?

By Bilal Y. Saab – I don’t know who is perpetrating terrorist acts in Syria. There are three likely suspects: the Syrian government, the armed rebels, or al-Qaeda (it could be other suspects too but these are the more likely ones). There is plenty of reason to believe that Syrian president Bashar Assad and his cronies could be behind the bombings. They want to show the international community, and especially Washington, that they are fighting terrorists and members of al-Qaeda. I say that this proposition is extremely risky, and if it gets out of hand, could lead to external military intervention, something that, ironically, Assad is trying very hard to avoid. Here are my thoughts on CNN’s GPS with Fareed Zakaria (May 11, 2012).

 

 

The Washington Post ran a story Thursday with the headline “Suicide attack in Syria makes international action less likely.” The author concludes that the recent upswing in terrorist violence actually decreases the chances of U.S., NATO or Arab-Turkish military intervention in Syria.

 

I argue it may well be the opposite.

 

Should Syria descend into total, Iraq-style chaos and start to resemble a failed state that is unable to fight terrorism, secure its own borders and safeguard its suspected weapons of mass destruction, the Obama administration will find the military option — whatever shape or form it may take — more appealing and suitable to contain the crisis.

 

While President Obama is still not in a position to seriously consider intervening in Syria— both because of the upcoming election and because of the very real risks and difficulties of any military strategy — his hand could be forced by developments on the ground and intelligence reports inWashington.

 

Imagine this not-so-improbable scenario: If Obama starts to receive additional reports from his intelligence advisors that al Qaeda is gaining ground in Syria and about to establish another safe haven in the Middle East along the borders of that country, he may have little choice but to reassess his options.

 

The political costs of another U.S. intervention in the Muslim world are evident and likely to be high given the “intervention fatigue”  in Washington and the nonexistent appetite for costly foreign adventures among the U.S. public. But if CIA Director David Petraeus and Intelligence Director James Clapper call tomorrow for a meeting and brief Obama about increasingly disturbing al Qaeda activity in Syria, the president cannot ignore their assessments. Obama might still decide that the costs of intervention are higher, but that decision will not be easy.

 

And should it become clearer to everyone that Syria is starting to pose a real and urgent threat — not only to regional security but also to international security and U.S. strategic interests — inaction on the part of the president will have its political costs, too.

 

You can already anticipate the fierce debate and political circus in Washington that could emerge from this potential scenario. Conservative outlets will not miss the opportunity to say that Obama is unwilling to protect Americafrom international terrorism and safeguard U.S. strategic interests abroad because he is focused on his re-election campaign. Of course, the argument will be utterly unfair and ridiculous given Obama’s almost impeccable foreign policy record and his ability to make tough calls like the raid on Osama bin Laden. Yet the president would still have to deal with it and prepare himself for the possibility that such news will only help his adversary in November.

 

This is all hypothetical, of course, andSyriais not a failed state yet. Also, we still do not know for sure who is committing these terrorist acts.

 

It could be al Qaeda. Ayman al-Zawahiri has already stated his interest in establishing a base in theLevant, and there are more-than-capable members of the organization in Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Lebanon who could fulfill his vision.

 

But it could also be the Syrian government. It is not unthinkable that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad or his cronies could be ordering these attacks. Part of al-Assad’s survival strategy is to tell the world, and especially the United States, that he is fighting terrorists and thus should be given a chance to finish the job so that he can initiate political reforms. Surely another 55 deaths, when more than 10,000 are already dead, would not cause him to pause or rethink his strategy.

 

But, ironically, what al-Assad does not seem to be realizing is that the more he tries to convince Obama and the international community that al Qaeda is involved in his country, the closer Washington gets to make the decision of employing military force. He sealed his own fate the moment he decided to shoot to kill when the Syrian uprising started in January of last year.

 

With his risky “I am fighting al Qaeda” strategy, he may also be hastening his demise.Washingtonmight not tolerate an al Qaeda victory in the Middle East, election season or not.

 

Here is a link to the piece: 2012/05/11/al-assad-is-shooting-himself-in-the-foot/ 

 

 

Jordan made the right decision

By Chen Kane – Earlier this week Jordan announced that it has entered the final phase of deliberations with two potential suppliers for its first nuclear power reactor. The good news: the Canadian company AECL is out of the race, leaving the Russian firm Atomstroyexport and a French-Japanese consortium comprised of AREVA and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries as contenders. Not that I have anything against Canadians; I love Canadians. But I wouldn’t want to see CANDU (Canada Deuterium Uranium) reactors anywhere in the Middle East.

 

 

In May 2010, Jordann arrowed down its potential reactor designs to three: the Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd’s (AECL’s) Enhanced CANDU 6 (EC6) reactor,  the AES-92 VVER-1000 reactor from the Russian firm Atomstroy export, and the ATMEA1 reactor by AREVA and Mitsubishi. Jordan was expected to announce its choice of vendor this month, but decided to enter parallel negotiations with the Russians and Japanese-French companies.Ammanhopes to start operating its first nuclear power plant in 2020.

 

The CANDU was an attractive option for Jordan: Jordan has an indigenous supply of natural uranium which could be used to fuel the reactor. That would have allowed it to enrich uranium in country – as opposed to sending the uranium abroad for enrichment and incurring substantial costs. AECL’s offer of two small reactors (700-MW each), was also attractive since it allows redundancy in case one reactor goes out of service – a feature that the two other bidders did not offer.

 

On the other hand, of the three reactor designs Jordan examined, the CANDU design had the highest proliferation risk. Aside from tritium production as a by-product in these reactors (tritium is used to boost the yield of nuclear weapons and is a necessary component of both fission and thermonuclear weapons), safeguards application on CANDU reactors is substantially more difficult than on light water reactors. CANDU fuel bundles are smaller, there are more fuel elements in the core and in storage, and the CANDU reactor’s online refueling feature greatly expands the potential diversion scenarios. So, Jordan’s decision to drop the CANDU was important and very positive. I hope Turkey will follow suit.

 

Still, Jordan has yet to reach a final decision on the reactor design and address several other crucial issues related to its program, such as spent fuel arrangements, the ability to finance the program, domestic enrichment, export controls, whether and when it will adopt the amended Small Quantities Protocol, and site selection.Jordan’s decision on each of these issues could have domestic, regional, and international implications.

 

 

Photo: Jordan Times.