Interview with Seth Smith on the downed Turkish jet

By Bilal Y. Saab – The Syrian conflict took a turn to the worse after Syria shot down a Turkish F-4 Phantom fighter jet on June 22. Here is what we know so far:

 

* Turkey has confirmed that the jet did cross into Syrian airspace.

 

* Syria has confirmed that it did shoot down the jet.

 

* The pilot and electronic warfare operator have not been recovered yet.

 

* The jet in question was an RF-4, a reconnaissance variant of the F-4 Phantom II.

 

* Turkey invoked Article IV of the NATO charter, which calls for consultation by NATO members when one is attacked or threatened. For those interested in the NATO Secretary General’s statement, here it is.

 

 

 

Numerous questions still loom over this incident, the answers to which could shed light on the potential for international intervention in Syria. For more on this story, I sat down with Seth Smith, Herbert Scoville Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Mr. Smith served six years in the U.S. Navy as a Persian-Farsi Crypto-linguist and airborne reconnaissance mission supervisor. He was considered a SME on the orders of battle of the Gulf State militaries and on the Iranian military capabilities and tactics.

 

1- Why was a Turkish fighter jet flying so close to – and possibly in – Syrian territory in the first place?

 

The answer to this question may lie in the type of aircraft that was shot down. According to a recent news report, the jet in question was an “R” variant of the F-4 Phantom. The “R” in the nomenclature stands for reconnaissance. Though it can be armed with bombs for targeting static ground forces/facilities and is a capable air-to-air combat fighter, the more common role for the Phantom is anti-aircraft missile suppression; an essential component of establishing air superiority and/or no-fly zones. An RF-4 would be equipped with specific electronic warfare capability for the identification of radar and missile sites in Syria that would need to be destroyed in the event of an air campaign. 

 

Initial thinking was that the Turkish jet was shot down by a SAM; however new reporting indicates that it was anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) fire that brought the jet down. If true, this information would refute Turkish claims that the jet was shot down in international airspace and would support Syrian claims that it was flying very low within Syrian territory, as AAAs are short-range air defense weapons. This would also indicate that the jet’s mission was focused more on testing and identifying Syrian air defense capabilities and not testing Turkish radar systems, as Turkey’s foreign minister recently stated.

 

 

2- Why did Syria shoot it down? Could it have avoided doing so?

 

Breaches of territorial airspace are not a rare occurrence for any nation. Unidentified aircraft are regularly spotted on radar systems and countries usually follow a prescribed protocol to identify those aircraft and their intensions. Attacking such aircraft is generally the last option on an air defense protocol. With this in mind, there are two possibilities as to why Syria fired on the Turkish jet:

 

1. Syria’s air defenses are on high-alert in light of the current unrest and threat of international intervention. As such, their rules of engagement are shoot-first, ask questions or apologize later.
2. A Syrian air defense operator spotted an unidentified aircraft and fired on it without authorization.

 

Either case is likely; however, in times of heightened tension or conflict, air defense postures can be recalibrated to decrease the options available to site commanders short of attack. Considering the current turmoil in Syria and the rhetoric of the international community, it is likely that the Syrian air defense posture is at high-alert. This would give lower-level commanders the authorization to fire on suspect aircraft without direct orders from a higher command. Takeaway, Syria’s armed forces have itchy trigger fingers (as if their brutality against their own people wasn’t proof enough).

 

So what does this incident mean in the context of potential intervention? The answer to that is still unclear. One thing is certain, the argument of international security experts that Syria is not Libya has been confirmed. No NATO aircraft were lost to enemy fire during the Libya operation. Even if it was a “lucky” shot, the incident demonstrates the capability of Syrian air defense systems. This will make an international community, already reluctant to get involved militarily in Syria, even more hesitant to do so – unanimous condemnation of Syria from NATO notwithstanding.

 

3- Do you think this incident will deter Turkey from sending more jets into Syrian airspace?

 

This incident will most likely dissuade Turkey from embarking on similarly risky missions, at least in the near future. Turkey has a much larger air force than Syria’s (twice as large) but in terms of modernity of technology the two countries are roughly evenly matched. The reluctance of Turkey’s NATO allies to get involved in Syria is another factor that could keep Ankara from pushing back too hard against Syrian action or risking further escalation by testing Syrian air defense capabilities in the near-term.

 

4- Does this change anything in the broader discussion about potential military intervention in Syria?

 

This incident has reminded us once again that Syria is not Libya. The United States was able to lead from behind in Libya because other NATO countries had sufficient capability to establish a no-fly zone with little risk to their aircrafts and pilots. And even in the Libyan case, leading from behind still necessitated the United States providing the lion’s share of ISR, targeting, and armaments capability in that campaign. Leading from behind in Syria does not look like an option. Even the often overly simplified “no-fly zone” would probably involve launching cruise missiles from Navy ships in the Mediterranean in conjunction with a large and sustained air assault.

 

5- What is the bottom line of this incident? What have we really learned?

 

Any international military intervention will require a sizeable force and a much more prominent role by the United States. Also, the risk of loss of life to all those involved will be much greater. Expect casualties. The stated goal in Libya was humanitarian assistance, not regime change (although one led to the other of course). How do you say “fool me once” in Russian? or in Mandarin? Barring the use of chemical weapons by Assad against the rebels, Russia and China probbaly won’t be offering any “Yes” votes regarding intervention in Syria. For the right price, however, the Russians can be convinced to cooperate and agree on covert (not overt) actions in Syria. But their laundry list of demands is ridiculous.

 

 

 

 

 

A mysterious assassination in Syria

By Bilal Y. Saab – I just saw a story in Arabic by SANA (link here in English), the Syrian state news agency, that an “armed terrorist group” assassinated Dr. Ahlam Imad (a female), a Professor at Petrochemical Engineering Faculty at al-Baath University in Homs. They attacked the house of Dr. Imad at al-Hossn town, Homs countryside, and killed her and family members (mother, father and three children of her sister). Neighborhood folks informed the Syrian army (or security services) who intervened and clashed with the terrorists. This resulted in the killing of 10 “terrorists.”

 

 

A quick note about SANA, which I am sure Syria watchers know already: It is the Syrian government. Therefore, their credibility as a news agency is zilch. So whenever you see the word “terrorist group,” you can substitute it with “rebels or Free Syrian Army.” There is a risk, of course, with this approach because sometimes it may well be terrorists, and it’s a boy who cried wolf situation. Let’s face it, nobody knows a damn thing about who is operating on the ground in Syria.

 

Why am I mentioning this story?

 

As we try to assess the risk of chemical weapons proliferation (or usage) in Syria (my first effort culminated in an article that appeared on Foreign Policy called Assad’s Toxic Assets, which I re-posted on this site), any piece of information on that extremely sensitive and opaque topic is worth scrutinizing. I also suspect that this story will slip under the radar of the Western press, so there is value in making it available on this blog to specialists, journalists and general public.

 

We don’t have more details on the story. Indeed, it is rather thin. We don’t know why the killers targeted the professor and killed her and almost her entire family. I presume she is Alawi (she may not be), and sectarian killings are rampant today in the conflict in Syria. But even if she is not, her profession is interesting, and has led me to these questions:

 

1- Did the killers approach the professor because of her expertise? If yes, did they seek knowledge about chemical agents/weapons and she refused to cooperate, hence her murder?

 

2- Or did she cooperate but they killed her afterwards anyway? In this case, should we assume that the rebels have possession of sensitive information on the regime’s chemical arsenal? I realize she specializes in petro-chemicals (oil industry) but she is a professor and there is a good chance her expertise covers chemical agents including gas. There must be high-ranking, defected soldiers in the Syrian army who know something about the arsenal, but did they instruct their colleagues to gather as much information as possible and target people with expertise like the professor?

 

3- What if it is al-Qaeda and not the rebels? Do they have possession of CW knowledge now? Assume everything.

 

It must be Mr. Plum with a dagger in the kitchen, then. This murder is definitely intriguing, and I intend to keep watching it very closely and reach out to my sources inside and outside Syria to try to inquire into what really happened (not sure they will know, either). I am not saying this is breaking news, it could be nothing and it might have been a coincidence that she was a professor of petrochemical engineering, but I doubt it. There is something fishy about this story, and I am not willing to let it go, yet.

 

PS: I just looked up Prof. Imad on al Baath University’s Petrochemical Engineering Faculty and was able to find out more information about her (link here, however it is in Arabic, sorry for those who can’t read Arabic). She joined the university in 2005, she has a Ph.D. (1991) in technical sciences from the Moscow Institute for Oil and Gas. Her specialty is refinery engineering (in Arabic handasat takrir), so not on chemical agents.

 

 

 

Do Arab rulers and publics think the same about Iran’s nuclear program?

By Chen Kane – I find public opinion polls highly problematic, especially when conducted in non-democratic states. Aside from the multiple “technical” issues of designing “objective” questions and gathering a representative sample of the population, the answers of those surveyed in closed societies could be biased and influenced by concerns about the identity of the pollsters, the purpose of the survey, and the likelihood that anonymity will not be respected.

 

 

These concerns caused my hesitation about writing on the latest Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project. But then again Pew is one of the most respected polling centers in the world, and if anyone should know how to poll, it should be them. Also, the poll has some relevance to the ongoing round of nuclear talks in Moscow between the P-5+1 and Iran, so it got me curious.

 

Thanks to Wikileaks, we now know what some officials in the Arab world think or are willing to say behind closed doors. “We are all terrified,” said former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak to a U.S. congressional delegation, “and Egypt might be forced to begin its own nuclear weapons program if Iran succeeds in those efforts.” Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan, Abu Dhabi’s crown prince, believed that ‘all hell will break loose’ if Iran attains the bomb, while King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia urged the United States to attack Iran and ‘[cut] off the head of the snake’ before it is too late. Similarly, King Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa of Bahrain said: “That program must be stopped…. The danger of letting it go on is greater than the danger of stopping it.”

 

Relations between rulers and publics are increasingly strained in the Arab states and the question I was most interested in is whether the positions expressed by Arab leaders are shared by the citizenry. The answer, at least based on the findings of the newest Pew poll, seems to be mostly yes. Zogby’s latest poll, Arab Attitudes toward Iran, found similar findings.

 

The Pew poll surveyed 21 nations, of which five are from the Middle East – Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Turkey. The survey was conducted face-to-face in the Arabic and Turkish languages between March and April 2012, involving 1,000 people in each of the regional countries, and the data produced involved a margin of error of 3.5%. It is worth mentioning that Pew has been polling on the Iranian nuclear issue as part of its Global Attitude survey since 2006. 

 

The survey shows that 76% of Jordanians, 66% of Egyptians and 54% of Turks oppose Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, while Tunisians are divided on this question, with 42% in favor and 43% against Iran acquiring nuclear weapons.

 

Question: “Would you favor or oppose Iran acquiring nuclear weapons”

Interestingly enough, there is little correlation between opposition to Iran acquiring nuclear weapons and threat perception. The majority of Lebanese and Egyptians (57% and 54% respectively) see a nuclear-armed Iran as a threat. 55% Jordanians and 57% Tunisians do not share these perceptions, despite Jordan’s overwhelming popular opposition to Iran’s potential acquisition of such weapons.

 

It seems that while Jordanians do not feel their country is threatened directly by Iran possessing the bomb, they are concerned by the regional implications of a nuclear armed-Iran. Therefore, Jordanians are against Iran acquiring nuclear capabilities.

 

Question: If Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons, would this represent a very serious threat to our country, a somewhat serious threat, a minor threat, or no threat at all?

 

As for what measures should be used to prevent Iran from getting the bomb, of those who opposed, most also supported tougher economic sanctions against Iran (74% of Lebanese, 70% of Egyptians and 68% of Jordanians surveyed). Most of the Turks surveyed (52%) are against tougher sanctions, probably owing to trade and energy interdependence between Turkey and Iran.

 

Question: Do you approve or disprove of tougher international economic sanctions on Iran to try to stop it from developing nuclear weapons?

 

 

When those opposing Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons were asked, which is more important, in their opinion – preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it meant taking military action, or avoiding military conflict with Iran, even if it meant that Iran may develop nuclear weapons – most Jordanians (50%), Lebanese (46%) and Egyptians (52%) identified preventing Iran’s development of nuclear weapons as a priority even if meant taking military action. In contrast, the majority of Turks (42%) preferred to avoid armed confrontation, even if it meant a new nuclear-armed state in their neighborhood.

 

Question: In their opinion which is more important: preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons, even if it meant taking military action, OR avoiding a military conflict with Iran, even if it means they may develop nuclear weapons?

 

 

I am tempted to conclude that based on this poll’s results a majority in the Arab countries surveyed are concerned about Iran acquiring nuclear weapons, perceive it as a threat (even if not a direct one), and would be willing to support sanctions and even military force to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb.

 

Of course, my problem with polls has not disappeared all of a sudden and I still think we may be able the get exact opposite results if the questions are asked slightly differently. However, since both Pew and Zogby identify similar trends, I believe we should further explore whether and why Iran may be perceived as a threat by some Arab states and their public and what they think should be done about it. The Arab states can conveniently sit still while negotiations with Iran are conducted by the West. But if no agreement is reached, the big question leaders and people in the region should ask themselves is what they can do if Iran continues to develop its nuclear program and possibly gets the bomb? 

 

 

A closer look at Jordan’s nuclear energy plans

By Ala’ Alrababah and Ghazi Jarrar – Sheikh Hamzeh Mansour, chief of the Islamic Action Front, the political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Jordan, criticized Jordan’s nuclear program in an interview with The Jordan Times:

 

“If implemented, Jordan will suffer the project’s dangerous political, economic, social, financial, health, environmental and security burdens in return for selling others clean electricity at cheap prices and on their terms.”

 

 

Clearly, Sheikh Mansour views the nuclear program as an assured disaster. He is not the only one. Environmental activists have repeatedly protested against the project. Moreover, the parliament has recently passed a legislation to halt the program. Despite these incidents, it is possible to argue that there are many benefits to Jordan’s nuclear program.

 

Jordan currently imports about 96% of its energy needs, which amounts to about 20% of its GDP. Besides, Jordan’s energy demands are increasing at a rate of 6% a year. Nuclear power would allow Jordan to produce about 30% of its own energy. This would mean that the outrageously high price of electricity would go down. By allowing Jordan to export energy, nuclear power would also bring much needed revenue to the country.

 

There are other potential benefits from nuclear energy. Nuclear power would reduce the leverage oil-producing Gulf countries have over Jordanian affairs. Also, many perceive nuclear energy to be a source of national pride. By becoming a nuclear country, Jordan could elevate its position among the world states.

 

Some Jordanians fear the health impact of nuclear energy. However, this concern is inconsistent with the safety record of nuclear power. Of the 14,500 reactor-years of commercial nuclear power, only three major accidents occurred. Those incidents, when dealt with well, did not lead to severe casualties. Also, such incidents are less likely to happen in the future. Modern nuclear reactors are much safer than nuclear reactors at Chernobyl, or even Fukushima. The health impact of radioactive material is also insignificant. In fact, Dr. James Conca, an international expert on the environmental effects of radioactive contamination, says in his must-read article:

 

Every time I eat a bag of potato chips I think of Fukushima. This 12-ounce bag of chips has 3500 picoCuries of gamma radiation in it, and the number of bags I eat a year gives me a dose as high as what I would receive living in much of the evacuated zones around Fukushima.

 

Given these advantages of nuclear energy, and its relatively good safety record, why have many Jordanians been vigorously opposed to it?

 

Some have been against the nuclear program merely to oppose the government’s stance. The Muslim Brotherhood has a long record of objecting any government policy. In fact, while the Jordanian MB opposes the nuclear program, the Egyptian MB criticized Mubarak’s regime for not pursuing nuclear energy in 2006. And when Mubarak decided to develop a peaceful nuclear program, the brotherhood was not satisfied — they were already demanding an Egyptian nuclear weapons program!

 

Others seem to have legitimate concerns. Those who protest the project for its environmental impact are one such group. Their concerns are pivoted around the fact that while many advanced countries are in the process of replacing their nuclear plants with renewable sources of energy (most notably Germany and Japan), only 1% of Jordan’s energy sources are renewable. This is unfortunate given that Jordan has significant potential in utilizing solar energy. Hence, activists encourage investing in such environmental friendly projects. We believe that if managed correctly, the nuclear program in Jordan would actually help the environment by reducing dependence on fossil fuel. However, the Jordan Atomic Energy Commission (JAEC) has not been effective at illustrating the advantageous environmental impact of the project. In fact, JAEC’s website reads like a middle school textbook when discussing the impact on the environment, with no concrete data or numbers provided.

 

Environmentalists also fear the health impact of the program because of radiation and nuclear waste management. While the JAEC has tried to assure the public that the reactor will follow strict international standards, many Jordanians have understandably not bought into this. Jordan’s mediocre record with regards to the environment legitimizes skepticism. A trip to the Russeifeh solid waste landfill outside Amman, or to the industrial locations in al-Zarqa, would explain why people are worried. If there were more transparency and checks and balances, the Jordanian public might be less cynical. Unfortunately, this is not the case.

 

The cost of the project has alarmed many in the kingdom. A study by the JAEC shows that the costs would be less than US$10 billion, while the annual revenue would be about US$1 billion. However, those estimates do not account for the potential cost of corruption, which is not insignificant in Jordan. In fact, it is easy to understand why Jordanians take the possibility of corruption seriously. Do you remember the Amman Rapid Bus Transit? How about the Casino Gate? The list goes on.

 

Moreover, JAEC chairman, Khaled Toukanm, did not help his case when he called opponents to the program “donkeys and garbage-men.” Those comments reminded Jordanians of the government’s arrogance, and of its heavy-handed approach to the matter.

 

The Jordanian government has a difficult task ahead of it. This project is extremely important. To persuade the public of the value of nuclear power, much needs to be done. For one, people would appreciate more transparency about the costs of the project, and a thorough evaluation of the health and environmental risks associated with the reactor. As for the reoccurring theme of corruption in Jordan, a system of checks and balances would help not only with this project, but also for any other major enterprise in the future.

 

 

Ala’ Alrababah, who attends Dartmouth College, is Davis Fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Ghazi Jarrar is a student at Dalhousie University, Halifax. Alrababah and Jarrar blog at ghurbeh.wordpress.com

 

Photo: Green Prophet.

 

Delivery systems: A key component of a Middle East zone free of WMD

By Carlo Trezza – The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference resolution on the Middle East and the 2010 Review Conference declaration on the Middle East call for the establishment of a WMD- free zone. The two documents also include a provision for the elimination of the “delivery systems” for such weapons. There is no precedent for such a wide and comprehensive regional arms control effort. All previous similar regional initiatives were confined to nuclear weapons.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

The 2010 mandate also requires maintaining a “parallel progress, in substance and timing, in the process leading to achieving the total elimination of WMDs in the region.” Negotiations on nuclear, chemical and biological weapons should therefore evolve in parallel: progress only on one or two of those three chapters is not possible. This provision does not specifically refer to delivery systems, which could, in principle, evolve independently.

 

The most significant precedents of international regulation on WMD delivery systems, which serve as reference, are the following:

 

 A-    The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) established in 1987 which seeks to limit the risks of proliferation by controlling exports of goods and technologies that could make a contribution to WMD delivery systems (other than manned aircraft). The regime places particular focus on missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) capable of delivering a payload of at least 500 kg to a range of at least 300 km. The MTCR parameters might provide a useful reference for the Middle East negotiators. MTCR however is a technology transfer control regime and not a regional weapons prohibition instrument. It is not legally binding and has no verification provisions. The MTCR exclusion of manned aircraft would not apply to the WMDFZ in the Middle East.

 

B-    The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), an offshoot of the MTCR, is basically a transparency mechanism, adopted in 2002. Its main features are information exchanges by states on their policies regarding ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles and pre-notification of their launches. The Code refers exclusively to ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles (UAVs, manned aircraft and cruise missiles are excluded).

 

The Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East discussions were the most significant attempt to deal with arms control in the Middle Eastern region. They kicked off in 1991 but collapsed four years later primarily because of a (continuing) dispute between Egypt and Israel over the latter’s nuclear arsenal. Delivery systems were not discussed in any detail or length during the ACRS talks.

 

The INF treaty of 1987 between the United States and the Soviet Union that eliminated their intermediate and shorter-range nuclear missiles (defined as having a range between 500 and 5.500 km) appears as the most suitable bilateral term of reference for a total prohibition of missiles capable of delivering WMDs. Its sophisticated dismantlement techniques and verification measures, including the use of “National Technical Means,” are indicative of the high requirements and costs of effective elimination and verification mechanisms. A total prohibition would make verification easier: it would probably require an ad hoc multilateral effort.

 

UNSC resolutions 687 and 1284 dealt with Saddam’s Iraq and provided for the drastic elimination of missiles and intrusive verification. Resolution 687 of 1991 provided, inter alia, for the “destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision… of all ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers and related major parts and repair and production facilities.” With Resolution 1284 of 1999, UNSCOM was replaced by UNMOVIC which acted on the same missile parameters with a reinforced inspection system.

 

UNSC resolution 1929 of 2010 indicates that Iran shall not undertake any activity related to missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. States shall not supply Iran with combat aircraft, missiles or missile systems. The mechanisms established for Iraq and Iran are of a sanctionary nature and would not be suitable for a voluntary and consensual process such as the one foreseen under the NPT auspices. Syrian missile activities are not restrained by any UNSC resolution. All states of the region are legally bound by UNSC resolution 1540 of 2004 which affirms that proliferation of WMD “as well as their means of delivery” constitutes a threat to international peace and security.” This resolution aims at establishing national measures to prevent the proliferation of WMDs and their delivery means. For the purposes of this resolution the definition of “means of delivery” is: “missiles, rockets and other unmanned systems capable of delivering nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons that are specially designed for such use.” More specific definitions, to be built on the UNSCR 1540 definition, would probably be necessary for a regional prohibition in the Middle East.

 

While a legally binding and internationally verifiable prohibition of delivery system and their elimination would be the ultimate goal, a first step in a negotiating process should consist in confidence building measures. Because the HCOC already exists, the simplest way would be for the interested parties to join the Code of The Hague, a measure of soft security which would enhance confidence in the region. Moreover regional transparency measures are specifically foreseen by the Code and countries like Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, Morocco, Libya, and Sudan are already among its 134 subscribing states. MTCR, in view of its link with HCOC, could focus its attention on the Middle East in the coming years in a mutually supportive effort.

 

 

Ambassador (ret) Carlo Trezza is a member of the UN Secretary General’s Advisory Board for Disarmament Matters and former Italian Permanent Representative for Disarmament in Geneva. This article is part of a paper presented by the author during a May 2012 conference in Alghero, Italy on the 2012 MEWMDFZ Conference under the auspices of the Peace Research Institute Frankurt  and the Hessische Stiftung Friedens und Konfliktforschung

 

 

The bomb and the beard: The Egyptian MB’s views toward WMD

By Ibrahim Said – Egypt’s next leader could be a member of the once-banned Muslim Brotherhood (MB). Yet even if Muhammad Mursi, the presidential candidate fielded by the MB, does not win the elections, the Islamist movement-turned political party will have a growing role in Egyptian political life and a domineering presence in the country’s parliament. As a result, the perceptions, worldviews, and preferences of the Brothers’ leaders on various issues related not only to domestic affairs but also to foreign and security policy will come under greater scrutiny by the international community. One key area in Egyptian foreign affairs that could have significant implications for regional and possibly international security is nonproliferation and arms control. How much value does the Brotherhood place in Egypt’s nuclear program and in Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)? What are the MB’s views on nonproliferation? Should the world expect a radical shift in Egyptian nonproliferation and disarmament policy if Mursi and his colleagues come to power?  

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Before the uprising

 

In their 2005 parliamentary elec­tions plat­form, the MB declared that under their lead­er­ship, Egypt would develop “spe­cial national pro­grams, such as the nuclear pro­gram, the space and avi­a­tion pro­gram, arma­ments pro­gram, and the bio-technology pro­gram.” Indeed, revival of the country’s nuclear power pro­gram was a ral­ly­ing cry for the MB. The party, which at the time held roughly one-fifth of the seats in the Egypt­ian National Assem­bly (the lower house of the Egypt­ian par­lia­ment), used the nuclear issue to chal­lenge Mubarak’s government, which had shown lit­tle inter­est in nuclear energy, unlike a num­ber of states in the region includ­ing Iran, Kuwait, Jordan, the UAE, and Turkey.

 

By May 17, 2006, MB deputies were openly attack­ing the Mubarak gov­ern­ment for not pur­su­ing an active nuclear pro­gram. Ikhwanon­line, the offi­cial web­site of the MB, stated that Broth­er­hood “deputies accuse[d] the gov­ern­ment of aban­don­ing the nuclear pro­gram and [being con­tent with not] build­ing atomic power plants for peace­ful pur­poses and elec­tric­ity pro­duc­tion at the same time many other coun­tries such as India advanced in this field.”

 

Despite this initial focus on peaceful nuclear energy, at a July 4, 2006 joint meeting of the foreign affairs, Arab, defense, and national security committees of the Egyptian parliament, Dr. Hamdi Hassan, spokesperson of the MB parliamentary caucus, made clear that his organization was interested not merely in using nuclear power for meeting Egypt’s energy needs, but in creating an Egyptian nuclear deterrent: “We [Egyptians] are ready to starve in order to own a nuclear weapon that will represent a real deterrent and will be decisive in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”[1]Ahmed Diyyab, another member of the MB caucus, also attacked the Mubarak government’s nuclear policy, criticizing Egypt’s traditional role in leading states in the region to press for a Middle East Weapon-of-Mass-Destruction (WMD) Free Zone: “Is it realistic and diplomatically sound,” he asked, “to demand a weapons of mass destruction-free Middle East, while being aware of the presence of a staunch enemy [Israel] who does not, at all, abide by international community decisions?”[2] By implication, his suggestion that the Mubarak government’s traditional championing of a WMD-free zone was an insufficient safeguard of Egypt’s national interest amounted to another call by the Brotherhood for Egyptian acquisition of a nuclear deterrent as a more effective alternative.

 

As MB calls for Egypt to develop a nuclear deterrent against Israel were being made openly, the party started to challenge the Egyptian government’s opposition to Iran’s development of its nuclear program. Leading MB figures appeared to view Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear capability as beneficial to the Arab world because it would serve as a counterbalance to what they perceived as Israel’s military hegemony in the region. Speaking in April 2006, the vice-spiritual guide of the MB in Egypt, Mohammed Habib, stated, “I do not see any problem with Iran obtaining a nuclear weapon.” [3] He added that, “according to nuclear deterrence theory, even if Iran has a nuclear weapon, it will be used to face the Israeli nuclear arsenal. And, this will create a form of balance between the two parties: the Arab-Islamic party on one hand and the Israeli party on the other.”[4] Mr. Habib claimed that the majority of Egyptians share the MB’s view. He added: “I believe that it is not reasonable that Israel or the Zionist entity remains the only party in the region with more than 200 nuclear warheads.” [5]

 

In the summer of 2006, after having press­ed the Egypt­ian gov­ern­ment for more than a year to restart the country’s nuclear pro­gram, the MB openly called for Egypt to develop nuclear weapons as a counter to Israel’s nuclear capabilities. Against this back­ground, the group reacted with lit­tle enthu­si­asm to the September announce­ment by Gamal Mubarak, son of the former president, that Egypt would revive its peace­ful nuclear program – with­out declar­ing that Egypt would build a nuclear deter­rent. However, because the nuclear program enjoys tremendous and broad support among Egyptians, the MB had little choice but to support the initiative. “Politically, no one questions the rational approach of President Moubarak.”[6]Since 2006, quotes or statements on nuclear weapons did not appear on either the Arabic or the English official MB websites.

 

A Qatari newspaper reported on September 05, 2008 that Youssef Qaradawi, perhaps the most influential leader of the global MB, issued a fatwa (Islamic ruling) in his newest book calling on the Muslim World to acquire nuclear weapons.[7]In Jurisprudence of Jihad, Al-Qaradawi says that “I believe that the Muslim nation should have these illegal weapons since they will become the weapons which deter and frighten the enemies.” The newspaper report adds: “Al-Qaradawi pointed out that jurisprudence imposes a crystal clear religious obligation on Muslims to work hand in hand and do not have disputes in this regard. They should meet, not separate.” Al-Qaradawi says that peace is one of the sublime goals of the Muslim nation, but Muslims should not give up jihad completely since this position will make them vulnerable to the enemies. This fulfills the divine order in this Koranic verse: “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into [the hearts of] the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of Allah, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly.” [Koranic verse; Sura 8, Verse 80] Al-Qaradawi also stresses the need to have well-educated cadres in order to deal with the sophisticated weapons, according to the report. Al-Qaradawi rules out the possibility of launching a nuclear war since the Cold War proved the impossibility of waging a war between two great powers that are armed to the teeth with unconventional weapons. However, he says that the presence of a nuclear arsenal in the Muslim world will reduce the threat posed by its bitter enemies and make them think twice before attacking it.

 

Al-Qaradawi was also cited by a Al-Alam news report for criticizing the West for its silence and inaction in the face of the “Zionist regime’s” nuclear weapons stockpile. ^[8] At a meeting with Iran’s ambassador to Qatar, Qaradawi said: “As we witness western states’ opposition to Iran’s legitimate right to use civilian nuclear technology, they have kept silent over the Zionist regime’s atomic arsenal.” The senior cleric further urged worldwide Muslims to maintain and reinvigorate solidarity and unity especially with Iran in order to confront the challenges and defuse the all-out pressures exerted by the enemies of Muslim world. He called for the deepening of the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity among Muslims in an effort to confront the problems and challenges facing the world of Islam. The Islamic scholar highlighted the grave and cumbersome conditions in a number of Islamic states, specially people’s living conditions in the Gaza Strip in Palestine. He urged cooperation and consultations among Muslim states and nations to help resolve problems in Palestine and defuse enemies’ plots.

 

After Mubarak

 

On January 25, 2010 Qaradawi reemerged in Tahrir Square during the peak of the uprising. He returned to Cairo immediately after the collapse of Mubarak’s regime to deliver a sermon in the heart of the capital that drew more than 200,000 participants. In his speech, he was reported to have encouraged unity between Muslims and Christians, and praised the Egyptian army for facilitating the people’s expression of freedom and democracy. The politically astute cleric also voiced staunch support for Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Qaradawi’s appearance was warmly received by the large crowd, touching off debate as to whether the cleric had any intention of claiming the mantle of revolution and, if he did, how the Egyptian public might react. Qaradawi was reported to have mentioned that Muslim nations “must possess such weapons in order to strike terror in our enemies,” but “not use them.” “If we had nuclear weapons, they would be afraid to attack us, as was the case between the Soviet Union and the Americans, and between India and Pakistan. This is armed peace.”[9]

 

On March 20, 2012, Salem Abdel Galeel, 1^st deputy assistant of Ministry of Awqaf, (who is considered as a MB associate) declared in a meeting at the International Center for Strategic and Future Studies in Cairo, that acquiring WMD is not a leisure anymore and it is a necessity in our contemporary world, he asked what a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East means if our neighbor acquires hundreds as reported? He also maintained that these weapons are not for use but only for deterrence. [10]

 

Conclusion

 

The MB leaders’ statements regarding Egypt’s nuclear program and WMD are interesting and worth scrutinizing, but we should be very careful not to jump to conclusions. These statements do not represent official government policy – yet. Furthermore, once in power, the MB are likely to tone down their rhetoric and moderate their policies. The burden of governance will be overwhelming and the MB are experienced and astute enough to realize that their words and actions will be put under the microscope. They will also be held accountable not only by the international community but also by those who elected them to office. Politics and international pressures are likely to influence the MB’s principles and earlier positions on nonproliferation. But we will have to wait and see how this one will play out.

 

 

 

 

 

 

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[1] Hani Adel, “Noowab al ikhwan yantaqidun assiyasa al kahrijiyya wa yutaliboon bimtilak assilah annawawi [Muslim Brotherhood deputies criticize foreign policy and demand owning a nuclear weapon], Ikhwanonline, July 5, 2006.

SALT lessons for the Iran nuclear talks in Moscow

By Bilal Y. Saab – There is a consensus among American analysts and several current and former officials in the Obama administration including Dennis Ross that Tehran concedes only when it is under pressure. This makes sense and it applies not just to Iran but to any country, corporation, or societal actor that is in the midst of negotiations. You can say that these are the ABCs of negotiations. If you find yourself at risk of significants costs, you concede, it’s that simple. Or is it?

 

 

Is it really true that a hard bargaining strategy by the P5+1 and the threat of comprehensive sanctions will push the mullahs to make the necessary concessions (no 20% enriched uranium on Iranian soil)? Some assess the record of the negotiations since 2003 and find evidence to suggest that tough bargaining coupled with economic sticks and threats of military action have led to Iran softening its position.

 

But if you read Seyed Hossein Mousavian’s new book The Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir, there is a crucial point made by the author regarding Iran’s refusal to agree to anything if it is seen as doing so under pressure. Mousavian is not just a scholar at Princeton, he was Iran’s Ambassador to Germany, head of the Foreign Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council and a spokesman for Iran in its talks with the EU.  David Ignatius of the Washington Post picked up on this theme in a May 24 column of his. Ignatius says the following:

 

“It’s useful to view recent negotiating history through Iranian eyes, as Mousavian does. Here’s what this optic reveals: Khamenei in 2005 removed his ban on negotiations with America; Iran in 2009 offered to export to the U.S. its 20 percent enriched uranium, and it renewed this offer with greater specificity in 2010 and 2011; Iran last July accepted a Russian proposal to suspend further enrichment capacity and accept the IAEA’s so-called “additional protocol” for intrusive inspection. The Iranians think they got nothing but more sanctions for these moves.”

 

One can understand Iran’s rationale. A major concession by Tehran can be interpreted by the West as a sign of weakness. But if Tehran does not concede, it could face military action and will have to deal with devastating sanctions. The challenge for Iran, therefore, is to prevent war and more painful sanctions but refrain from showing weakness. The challenge for the West, on the other hand, is to induce cooperation by Iran without appearing too tough and exploiting Iran’s vulnerability. If we believe Catherine Ashton’s and other EU diplomats’ statements that a deal can be reached and that there is sufficient common ground between Iran and the West, it comes down to bargaining strategies and skills on both sides.

 

History is almost always full of useful lessons. If reading and assessing the record of the Iran-West nuclear talks is proving to be difficult, you can always examine the records of other tough inter-state negotiations in the past and try to see what bargaining strategies were used by both sides to achieve agreement. I take a look at the record of the SALT talks.

 

In an influential, September 1984 study called Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979, Lloyd Jensen suggests that a hardline stand by the United States produced Soviet concessions in the SALT talks, as well as in earlier negotiations on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. For the 1969-1979 period, which witnessed 23 rounds of US-Soviet negotiations, Jensen compiled 113 concessions and 6 retractions for the Soviet Union, and 81 concessions and 7 retractions for the United States. Because each concession and retraction was not equal, Jensen weighed them by using a five-point scale. A major concession such as the United States’ acquiescence to inspection by national means or the Soviet Union dropping its demand for abolishing or counting forward-based systems as strategic arms was represented by a higher score. That the Soviets made more concessions than the Americans was not that significant or particularly revealing because it said nothing about initial negotiating positions. However, the fact that there were so few retractions on the part of either side was indicative of a continuing narrowing of differences that facilitated the successful conclusion of both SALT I and SALT II (though the Carter administration failed to win the consent of the Senate to ratify SALT II, but that is irrelevant to this point).

 

Such narrowing of differences is desperately needed between Iran and the P5+1, but if history is any guide and previous strategic arms control talks between the superpowers offer any lessons, the US-led P5+1 should stick to a hard bargaining strategy to induce concessions by Iran. But another equally important lesson of past US-Soviet interactions during the SALT period, which Richard J. Stoll and William McAndrew discuss in a June 1986 article of theirs also called Negotiating Strategic Arms Control, 1969-1979, is that such interactions were characterized more often by cooperative reciprocity (various forms of tit for tat) than by inverse reciprocity (various forms of exploitation). Of course, Iran is not the Soviet Union and there can be a gazzilion of reasons why the Soviet Union made concessions which might have little to do with the US negotiating strategy. Controlling for other variables is always a challenging exercise. But despite its potential irrelevance to the Iran nuclear case, the US-Soviet record in SALT is hard to ignore.

 

For the Moscow talks, the bottom line is this: Washington and its allies might be better off keeping their hardline stance but also sweetening the pot in order to create this virtuous cycle of mutual concessions with the Iranians. Obviously this is not just about the bomb for Iran, it is about the survival of its regime and the protection of its security interests.

 

 

 

Egypt’s next leader

By Bilal Y. Saab – I am fascinated by the current political debate among Egyptians. There is real freedom of speech in Egypt today, which is so refreshing. But what do Egyptians want? Shibley Telhami and colleagues try to provide answers to this question in this public opinion survey, which they conducted in early May 2012. I encourage you to read its findings. On foreign affairs, the numbers I am most interested in are the 73% of Egyptians supporting presidential candidate Mitt Romney and 25% supporting President Barak Obama (I suspect they see that Obama failed to ease the suffering of Palestinians or pressure Israel to stop building more settlements. Perhaps also that Obama has mishandled the Arab Uprising). And 68% still have a very unfavorable view of the United States. I am actually surprised this number is not higher.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

But I would like to focus on another issue in the survey, which is the kind of leader Egyptians want for the future: 35% identified Anwar Sadat, 26% Gamal Abdel Nasser, and 15% Erdogan. So a little more than one-third of those asked picked Anwar Sadat, a former Egyptian president who made the historical move of signing a peace treaty with Israel in 1979 and ending decades of conflict between the two nations. That number is quite remarkable.

 

So how is that related to arms control? Well, it is, but in an indirect way. If Egyptians want a leader who can be non-dogmatic in foreign policy, who can propose bold initiatives, and who is not afraid of cooperating even with his worst enemies to safeguard national interests and enhance regional security, then that bodes well for the future of arms control in the Middle East. Despite the difficult and uncertain transition Cairo is currently going through, Egypt is still the most important political player in the Arab world, and the foreign policies Cairo formulates, including arms control, have significant implications for regional security. Egypt’s next president may be a member of the Muslim Brotherhood (Mursi) or a remnant of the old regime (Shafiq), but parts of Egyptian society (hopefully the majority) long for a leader who is like Sadat. And that counts, here is why.

 

The assumption is that Egypt’s Islamists, perhaps due to religious and/or ideological convictions, might cancel the peace treaty with Israel, or at least refuse to enter into any cooperative arrangements with the Jewish state on arms control. They might also value weapons of mass destruction programs and strategic weapons systems more than their predecessors. They might also have different threat perceptions as well as understandings of and appreciations for sovereignty, cooperation, and how international relations work. That may be all true, but none of it is inevitable, I guess we will have to wait and see..

 

But in any case, should Mursi or Shafiq show inflexibility in foreign policy (and particularly on arms control) this is likely to be checked by domestic political contexts and the reality of political costs at home. Specifically, if the public and other political parties inside and outside the government in Cairo desire and call for regional security cooperation (which brings me to the 35% for Sadat), Egypt’s next president may have little choice but to comply. Yet the stronger he becomes politically and the larger his support-base the better he will be able to insulate himself from such domestic costs and enjoy greater autonomy in foreign policy.

 

I may be over-analyzing this 35% and desperately trying to find even the smallest glimmer of hope regarding the future of arms control in the Middle East. But I do believe that this is a number worth watching simply because the voice of the Egyptian people will matter. 

 

 

Photo: Mahmus Hams/AFP/Getty Images